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Agenda item 70 (a)
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 24 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Humanitarian cooperation between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolution 2139 (2014)

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit the following information:

Since the outset of the crisis in Syria, humanitarian needs have grown and gained prominence as terrorism has escalated. Armed terrorist groups have entered and occupied densely populated regions, villages and urban areas. They have spread panic and terror among the population, which they have forcibly detained as human shields. They have secured and destroyed public facilities and State service providers, preventing the local population from accessing basic services. In view of that situation, and in the light of its constitutional responsibilities and its duty to protect its citizens, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has endeavoured to restore security and stability throughout the national territory and provide basic services for its citizens.

The armed terrorist groups have deliberately, systematically and extensively sabotaged the country's infrastructure and public service institutions. In addition, the unilateral measures imposed by certain States have affected the living conditions of Syrian civilians. As a result, humanitarian needs have expanded even as the capacity to respond has been stretched. Since 2012, the Syrian Government has therefore been working with the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations, formulating a succession of plans to respond to humanitarian needs in Syria. The most recent is the 2014 response plan, which was agreed a few months ago.

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The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic is convinced that the humanitarian crisis that has emerged in many parts of Syria cannot be tackled solely by providing emergency supplies for the population. Rather, it is essential to address the roots of the problem and its escalation. First and foremost, that means combating and eradicating foreign-backed terrorism in order to protect civilians from terrorist crimes, which have indiscriminately claimed a growing number of Syrian lives, and to restore safety, stability and normality. It is also important to rescind the unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States of America, its allies in the European Union and certain Arab States. Those measures have had a negative impact on the living conditions of Syrian civilians, impeding the delivery of such basic needs as food, medicine, medical supplies and basic services.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic therefore welcomed the contents of Security Council resolution 2139 (2014) concerning the humanitarian situation in Syria. The resolution refers plainly to the need to combat and eradicate terrorism. In so doing, it clearly recognizes the connection between the emergence and growth of humanitarian needs and the crimes of the armed terrorist groups. In a statement issued on 23 February 2014, the Government affirmed that it would continue to cooperate with the United Nations in order to provide and deliver humanitarian aid to those affected by the crisis in all governorates of Syria without distinction. It stressed its readiness to cooperate with the United Nations Resident Coordinator and with international humanitarian organizations active in Syria in order to determine mechanisms to implement the resolution based on respect for the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the guiding principles of United Nations humanitarian assistance in emergency situations, particularly respect for national sovereignty and the role of the State in supervising the distribution of humanitarian assistance in its territory.

Below is an overview of the cooperation in place between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations, and the steps that have been taken in that context.

I. Establishment of a joint Government-United Nations committee

In accordance with the Syrian official statement, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates and the United Nations Resident Coordinator met at the Ministry on 2 March 2014 and agreed to establish a joint Government-United Nations committee to formulate and approve a cooperation mechanism. The committee has met four times for guidance and operational purposes on 7, 10, 17 and 20 March 2014 respectively. It held in-depth discussions to identify those areas in which aid delivery faces particular difficulties and obstacles, and to determine the priorities in securing access. The committee agreed to plan aid convoys to those areas jointly; to identify civilians' needs and the means for their direct delivery; and to examine reports on implementation, access routes and entry points. Such action would avoid the problems that have affected aid convoys in certain areas, such as the abduction of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) personnel in Idlib governorate, which was caused by failure to coordinate with the Government or to follow the safe routes that the Government had suggested.

II. Access to the areas referenced in the Security Council resolution

1. Mu'addamiyat al-Sham

The Syrian Government requested the deployment of humanitarian assistance in cooperation with the United Nations to Mu'addamiyah and Adra al-'Ummaliyah. On 25 February 2014, the office of the Resident Coordinator stated in writing that the United Nations was prepared to deploy a joint inter-agency aid convoy to Mu'addamiyah. On 27 February 2014, the Syrian Government informed the United Nations of its agreement for the convoy to enter Mu'addamiyah on Sunday, 2 March 2014. However, on the agreed date, the United Nations refrained from deploying the convoy and, by memorandum of the same day, requested a delay in responding to the appeal of the population of Mu'addamiyah. On 18 March 2014, a United Nations convoy crossed the last military checkpoint, bringing humanitarian aid into Mu'addamiyah for direct distribution to the local population in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. The Syrian Government did everything necessary to facilitate its entry, but the convoy withdrew after being blocked by a number of local inhabitants. A local dignitary said that the people refused to accept the United Nations aid. In short, the Syrian Government has twice agreed to the deployment of the aid, on 2 and 17 March 2014 respectively; but the United Nations has been unable to deliver it owing to the stance of the population in Mu'addamiyah.

2. Adra al-'Ummaliyah

Although the Syrian Government gave its written approval to the Resident Coordinator on 11 and 13 March 2014, the United Nations has been unable to deliver aid to Adra al-'Ummaliyah. It made three attempts, on 11, 12 and 13 March 2014 respectively, but could not gain the agreement of the armed groups active in the area. The office of the Resident Coordinator stated that it had been unable to obtain the other side's approval for the entry of aid to Adra al-'Ummaliyah or Adra al-Balad. By memorandum of 13 March 2014, it requested that aid delivery should be postponed until such a time as the United Nations could ensure coordination with all parties.

3. Eastern Ghutah

In memorandums addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates on 27 February 2014, the United Nations sought agreement for aid convoys to Duma, Nashabiyah and Mulayhah in the eastern Ghutah. The office of the Resident Coordinator then requested, by memorandum of 2 March 2014, that the field visits to those areas should be postponed until the period from 13 to 20 March 2014 to allow for preparations to deploy convoys to Mu'addamiyah and Adra al-'Ummaliyah. The Syrian Government responded by memorandum of 12 March 2014 that the delivery of aid to those areas would need to be planned by the joint committee, in accordance with the agreement between the sides. On 16 May 2014, the Government notified the office of the Resident Coordinator that it approved the deployment of humanitarian aid to Duma town, in the eastern Ghutah, from 17 March 2014, on the understanding that the joint committee would be involved in identifying needs and access routes and determining how the United Nations and the Red Crescent would supervise the direct distribution of aid. On 19 March 2014, the United Nations again sought approval for the deployment of an aid convoy to Duma town on 20 March. The Syrian Government agreed by memorandum of 19 March.

Pursuant to that agreement, the United Nations has informed us that it has deployed a convoy of aid, vaccines and milk for children to Duma on 20 March, and that it has distributed those goods in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

Efforts towards national reconciliation have proved successful in various parts of the eastern Ghutah. As a result, it has been possible to deliver aid to those areas, the population has been able to return, and State institutions have been restored. The latter have worked to rebuild the damaged infrastructure and public service networks in the region. The most significant areas in which national reconciliation has been successful and the population has returned are Bab Bila, Bayt Saham and Yalda. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent delivered and handed out aid packages to 6,200 people on 19 February and to 12,000 people over four successive days from 23 February. The Red Crescent used mobile surgeries to dispense medical aid. Reconciliation has also allowed a return to normality; the inhabitants' needs have been met, and they have been able to return safely to their homes. That situation shows that humanitarian needs are reduced, and the obstacles to humanitarian aid disappear, as soon as the terrorist threat recedes.

A joint team of United Nations entities brought humanitarian aid to the town of Jadidat al-Shaybani, in Rif Dimashq, on 16 January 2014 and to the town of Ghizlaniyah, also in Rif Dimashq, on 18 January 2014.

4. Nubul and Zahra

The Syrian Government has repeatedly asked the United Nations to deliver emergency humanitarian aid to the towns of Nubul and Zahra, whose population has been under a merciless siege for over 600 days without access to food, medicine or any basic needs. In order to reaffirm those previous requests, on 2 March 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates sent a memorandum to the office of the Resident Coordinator requesting the delivery of aid to the two towns rapidly and as a matter of priority. Despite the current discussions, the United Nations has yet to do so. At the meeting of the joint committee on 17 March 2014, the Syrian Government agreed to the distribution of humanitarian aid to several villages in which armed terrorist groups are present, on the road to Nubul and Zahra, and approved a route to those locations from inside the city of Aleppo.

5. Yarmouk camp

During the period from 18 January to 21 March 2014, a total of 8,464 aid packages have been delivered to Yarmouk camp, in addition to bread, dates and milk. 3,879 civilians in a serious medical condition have been evacuated along with their close relatives, as have 150 pupils and students who can now continue their studies at Syrian schools and universities. Between 28 February and 17 March 2014, the aid delivery and evacuations were interrupted because armed terrorist groups had returned to the camp and attacked its civilian inhabitants, keeping them away from the aid delivery area. From 1 March, several attempts to deliver the humanitarian aid were thwarted by armed groups. On 17 March, at the food aid distribution centre on Ramah Street in Yarmouk camp, they opened fire on representatives of the General Administration for Palestinian Arab Refugees and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), after preventing civilians from reaching the location to receive aid and vaccinations and to evacuate the sick. A Palestine Red Crescent emergency vehicle attempted to drive

out of the camp to the delivery location, but it came under fire from terrorist snipers and gunmen. In the period from 19 to 21 March 2014 alone, despite coming under daily sniper fire and gunfire from the armed terrorist groups, UNRWA and the Palestine Red Crescent were able to bring 1,215 food packages and vaccinations and milk for children into the camp, and to evacuate 65 individuals in a serious medical condition. The Syrian Government continues to facilitate the delivery of aid and civilian needs to the camp in cooperation with the concerned Palestinian parties and UNRWA.

6. Old city of Homs

In Homs governorate, the Government authorities have worked with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and the United Nations working group to evacuate 1,366 civilians from the old city of Homs from Friday, 7 February 2014, and to provide them immediately with emergency medical treatment and direct assistance. The evacuated civilians were taken to their chosen places of residence, in accordance with their wishes. Temporary places of residence were provided to 124 civilians. Food aid was delivered, although the aid convoy came under armed attack twice before reaching the old city of Homs.

7. Other problematic areas in which aid has been delivered and distributed

On 7 March 2014, in cooperation with United Nations entities, the Homs branch of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent deployed two convoys of emergency aid to Hulah and Shin in Homs governorate. On 12 March 2014, in cooperation with the International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Raqqah branch of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent arranged to receive a 24-truck convoy of emergency supplies. In February 2014, 3,500 food packages were delivered to Ariha and 3,500 to Salqin, both in Idlib governorate. Humanitarian supplies have been delivered to other areas where access is difficult. For instance, supplies were delivered to Basr al-Harir village in Dar'a governorate on 28 February 2014; to the Barzah district of Damascus governorate on 27 February 2014; and to Dayr al-Zawr city and the rural districts of Abu Kamal, Mayadin, the subdistrict of Mahasin and other locations on 27 February 2014.

III. Cross-border aid delivery

When the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates met with the Resident Coordinator on 18 November 2013, he notified him formally that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic agreed to the delivery of United Nations emergency and humanitarian supplies into Syrian territory through the official border crossings with neighbouring States. The supplies would then be distributed through the main United Nations offices in Damascus and the branch offices in the governorates. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates met with the Resident Coordinator on 4 March 2014, he said that the Syrian Government agreed that the United Nations could use the Nusaybin border crossing with Turkey to bring humanitarian aid into the country and respond to the needs of Hasakah governorate. The Ministry confirmed its approval to the United Nations in writing on 12 March 2014. The United Nations began bringing humanitarian aid into the city of Qamishli through the crossing on 20 March 2014.

The humanitarian crisis in Hasakah governorate has been exacerbated because armed terrorist groups have cut off the overland route from the governorates of Dayr al-Zawr and Raqqah, preventing the United Nations from transporting humanitarian aid to Hasakah. The Syrian Government has therefore agreed to airlift aid from Irbil in Iraq to Qamishli airport in Syria. To date, four airlifts have been organized, with over 12 flights per airlift. In total, some 50 flights have brought humanitarian aid to Qamishli airport in order to cover Hasakah governorate.

The United Nations has continued to deliver humanitarian assistance across the Lebanese border. In response to a memorandum of 19 March 2014 from the World Food Programme, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave its approval by memorandum of 20 March 2014 for the delivery of food aid across the Nasib border crossing with Jordan in order to cover Dar'a and Suwayda governorates.

The Syrian Government emphasizes that the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations active in Syria must respect Syria's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law.

IV. Expansion of humanitarian relief operations

1. Opening of United Nations branch offices in five Syrian governorates

In 2013, the Syrian Government informed the United Nations that it agreed to the opening of branch offices in Suwayda governorate (to cover the South), the city of Qamishli in Hasakah governorate (for the North-East) and in Aleppo (for the North). Approval had previously been given for United Nations branch offices in Homs (for the central region) and Tartus (for the coastal region). With those five branch offices and its main office in Damascus, the United Nations is now in a position to meet humanitarian needs in the entire Syrian Arab Republic.

2. Facilitation and clarification of visa issuance procedures

The Syrian Government has addressed the concerns raised by the United Nations with regard to facilitating and clarifying the procedures for granting entry visas to staff members of international organizations active in Syria who have United Nations travel documents and wish to enter the country on contracts with those organizations or for temporary work visits. By memorandum of 3 March 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates informed the office of the Resident Coordinator of the new procedures.

It should be noted that the figures previously provided to the Security Council on entry visas that had not been approved are inaccurate. The Syrian Government has issued over 400 entry visas since it began collaborating with the United Nations on relief efforts; only 12 visa applications remain pending. Using the new mechanism, efforts are being made to expedite the issuance of entry visas to Safety and Security personnel.

3. Streamlining of procedures to facilitate humanitarian convoys

The competent Syrian authorities, the Resident Coordinator and the representatives of international organizations are discussing ways to adopt a new

mechanism to simplify procedures to facilitate humanitarian convoys and ensure their smooth passage through military checkpoints. A new mechanism has been adopted for that purpose, but there have been some gaps in implementation. The joint Government-United Nations team further discussed the mechanism on 17 March 2014 and explored possible alternatives.

4. International non-governmental organizations

The Syrian Government has taken the necessary steps to facilitate the humanitarian work of international non-governmental organizations, including by allowing site visits to projects carried out in the Syrian governorates in cooperation with Government authorities. International non-governmental organizations have signed memorandums of understanding with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and, in some cases, with the ministries responsible for their area of activity. There are currently 18 international non-governmental organizations active in Syria, and the Government is facilitating their work. At the same time, Syria stresses that they must abide by the memorandums of understanding that they have concluded, which govern their work inside the country.

5. Civil society associations and domestic non-governmental organizations

The Ministry of Social Affairs has approved a list of 137 civil society associations and domestic non-governmental organizations that can cooperate with United Nations humanitarian organizations to meet the humanitarian needs of all Syrian governorates. The Syrian Government is working to periodically expand the base of domestic civil society associations that have the capacity to cooperate with the United Nations in this area.

V. Protection of civilians

Since the Syrian crisis began, armed terrorist groups have been terrorizing innocent civilians by committing the most heinous crimes, including beheadings; consuming human hearts, livers and skin in public places; carrying out public executions; raping women and children; targeting residential areas and civilian homes, schools and hospitals with car bombs and indiscriminate daily shellfire in a number of governorates, particularly Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Ladhiqiyah; and destroying infrastructure and service facilities. The Syrian Government wrote to the Security Council in August 2013 listing 225 crimes of rape committed by the armed terrorist groups against Syrian women. It wrote a second letter in September 2013 regarding the suffering of women as a result of the fatwa on "sexual jihad". It sent two identical letters on crimes against children in November 2013. The letters gave documented details of violations committed against children, including child recruitment, killing, mutilation, sexual violence, targeting of schools and hospitals, and detention in exchange for monetary ransom or to pressure families to change their position. An additional report on the armed terrorist groups' crimes against children was sent in February 2014.

In fulfilling its constitutional duty to protect citizens from the criminal actions of armed terrorist groups, the Syrian State has assiduously strived to ensure that civilians are not affected by the military operations that are taking place in certain parts of the country. In cooperation with the United Nations and the International

Committee of the Red Cross, the Government seeks to evacuate civilians, whom armed terrorist groups are using as human shields, from hot spots. For example, working in cooperation with the United Nations, the Government was able to evacuate hundreds of civilians from the old city of Homs in March 2014. In November 2013, it worked with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to evacuate civilians from Mu'addamiyah. On 12 March 2014, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent established centres to provide assistance and vital services to some 1,980 civilians who had been evacuated from the area of Husn (Krak) in Rif Homs.

VI. Attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian facilities

1. Schools

In several of its reports, the United Nations noted that it had received reports that schools in many parts of Syria were being used for military purposes. However it also said that it had not received any specific information to confirm those reports. After writing to the Ministry of Education and other relevant Government agencies, the Organization was informed that armed terrorist groups were using schools in the areas in which they operated as training, torture and detention centres. The terrorists were also using the schools to store munitions and as bomb-making facilities, particularly vocational secondary schools. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates stands ready to cooperate with United Nations organizations operating in Syria in the investigation of these accounts, it wishes to stress that the Organization's reports should be based on documented and credible information (see annex for a list of the schools that, according to the reports of the Ministry of Education, have been vandalized or used for illicit purposes in the areas in which armed terrorist groups are present).

2. Hospitals

From the start of the events in Syria, armed terrorist group have systematically targeted the health sector, with a view to rendering the State incapable of providing essential services to Syrian citizens. Terrorist attacks have resulted in the destruction of 64 hospitals, 471 health centres and 412 ambulances. Armed terrorist groups have also occupied 32 hospitals in various parts of Syria and taken over 154 health centres (see annex for a list of targeted hospitals and health centres). For example, on 26 November 2013, a horrific massacre was committed at Dayr Atiyah Hospital in Rif Dimashq. The hospital's entire medical staff, including doctors and other health workers, were killed. Such crimes and the targeting of the health sector have made it necessary to use the military to protect some of these facilities against attacks by armed terrorist groups.

3. Infrastructure

As part of their systematic campaign of destruction, armed terrorist groups have been targeting the country's infrastructure in order to deprive civilians of vital services on which they rely. The terrorists have targeted electrical power stations, oil and gas pipelines, water treatment stations, grain silos, the road network, bridges, railways, telephone lines and pharmaceutical factories, causing material damage that is estimated to amount to billions of Syrian pounds.

4. Cultural legacy and historical sites

Armed terrorist groups have systematically destroyed and plundered several historical sites and monuments in Syria and converted them into military facilities. Moreover, they have carried out unauthorized excavation, causing great damage to Syria's cultural and human heritage and its people's history and cultural identity. The terrorists' crimes include the burning of the old market of Aleppo (the oldest market in the world), the Great Umayyad Mosque in Aleppo and many mosques, churches and monasteries in various Syrian cities. These groups, which espouse fundamentalist and takfirist ideology, did not even spare the statues of Syrian writers and scholars. They decapitated the statue of the famous Arab poet Abu al-'Ala al-Ma'arri in Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, Idlib governorate, and vandalized and destroyed the shrines of some saints and the companions of the Prophet. Such conduct is reminiscent of the destruction by the Taliban of statues of the Buddha and the vandalization and destruction of saints' shrines in Mali. The Syrian Government has called on the relevant United Nations organizations to put pressure on those States that support the terrorist groups to halt their repeated attacks against Syria's historical legacy, and to put pressure on neighbouring States to control their borders and halt the illicit transboundary trade in looted Syrian artefacts.

VII.

The Syrian Government is taking action to address cases involving the arrest of a number of local United Nations staff members. It emphasizes, however, that staff members must abide by their professional code of conduct and the laws of the country. On 20 March 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates provided the office of the Resident Coordinator with relevant information, some of it regarding cases in which local staff members had been tried by the competent judicial authorities because they had perpetrated, supported or facilitated terrorist crimes in Syria.

VIII. Provision of medical services

1. Child vaccinations

Syria has made significant progress in protecting children from various diseases and providing them with health care. Numerous diseases were non-existent before the crisis; polio, for example, had been eradicated in 1996. However, according to analysis by the World Health Organization, a polio virus strain that originated outside the country has now spread through certain areas of Syria. It has been shown conclusively that the virus was introduced by terrorists coming from abroad.

Despite many challenges, the Syrian Government continues to fulfil its duty to vaccinate children in all parts of the country, especially against polio, including in areas where armed terrorist groups are active. To that end, the Government has cooperated with specialized United Nations entities and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent to implement several monthly polio vaccination campaigns. The first, which took place in December 2013, successfully vaccinated over 2.5 million children, and approximately 2,873,000 children have been vaccinated in March 2014. These national campaigns are set to continue. The Syrian Government has decided that, in the areas it reaches, it will also provide milk to children being vaccinated.

2. Ensuring access to health care

Despite the difficulties resulting from terrorist attacks on health-care centres, the Syrian Government has consistently fulfilled its duty to provide Syrian citizens across the country with health care, including in problematic areas. It dispatches mobile clinics and provides medical facilities with the necessary supplies, including refrigeration equipment, vaccines and medicines. The Government has continued to pay health-care workers' wages in all areas, including those infiltrated by terrorist groups, and has trained volunteers to provide health-care services to the local inhabitants.

The Syrian Government has been striving to ensure that citizens everywhere receive medical and health-care services. When providing medical supplies, the United Nations must coordinate with the Ministry of Health to ensure that the supplies reach those truly in need, and are not stolen by armed terrorist groups in certain areas in order to treat their wounded. The Syrian Government is considering alternative ways to successfully deliver medical aid to civilians, as it has noticed that certain United Nations entities have used convoys to deliver medical equipment intended for specialist medical facilities to areas where no such facilities exist, thereby making it likely that the equipment will be seized by armed men and terrorists. The United Nations humanitarian aid convoy to Mu'addamiyah on 19 March 2014 included a wide range of medicines and medical supplies in huge quantities, even though it was unclear which medical facility in Mu'addamiyah would be able to use them.

IX. Concluding observations

1. Armed terrorist groups are present in many parts of Syria. They have attacked infrastructure and Government service providers, blocked major roads to disrupt civilians' movements, denied civilians their basic need and used them as human shields. The result has been a deep and worsening humanitarian crisis. The Syrian Government welcomes the fact that the Security Council has recognized the connection and, in resolution 2139 (2014), has affirmed the importance of combating and eradicating terrorism. The Syrian Government emphasizes that its authorities continue to fulfil their Constitutional duty to protect Syrian citizens from armed terrorist groups, while also striving to ensure that military operations to not affect civilians.

2. By ending their support for armed terrorist groups, State sponsors of terrorism would make it possible to address the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in many parts of Syria. Although certain States invoke their concern for the lives of Syrians and the importance of meeting Syrians' basic needs, they bear responsibility: first, for the crimes of the armed terrorist groups, for which they provide funds, arms, training and shelter, and second, for imposing the unilateral coercive measures that are worsening Syrians' living conditions and impairing their ability to meet their basic needs, including food and medicine. As if that were not enough, those States are shirking their commitment to provide the necessary funding for the Syria Crisis Humanitarian Response Plan, which was endorsed by the United Nations in cooperation with the Syrian Government. Indeed, only 9 per cent of the Plan has been funded at the time of writing.

3. The Syrian Government has recently adopted a series of measures to allow the United Nations to expand its humanitarian activities. However, there has been a lack of genuine coordination with the Government to determine response priorities,

effective needs, type of aid required and access routes. This has caused chaos, waste and numerous gaps that require earnest attention. The Syrian Government therefore emphasizes that the joint Government-United Nations team must realistically evaluate and jointly plan humanitarian aid convoys by identifying needs and the types of aid required, supervising aid distribution and ensuring transparency, responsibility and credibility in order to avoid chaos, waste and looting or theft by armed terrorist groups.

4. If efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to all areas of Syria are to prove successful, they must be based on the guidelines regulating the emergency assistance of the United Nations as set forth in General Assembly resolution 46/182, particularly the principles of neutrality, impartiality, non-politicization of humanitarian work and respect for national sovereignty. Aid has not been delivered to certain areas besieged by armed groups, such as Nubul and Zahra in the Aleppo countryside. Instead, the focus has been on delivering aid to areas in which armed terrorist groups prevail, including areas where there are no civilians. This situation undoubtedly calls into question the true aims of the politicized approach adopted by certain donor States, which are intent on inflaming the Syrian crisis, and by certain international officials.

5. Syria emphasizes that the humanitarian situation must not be used for political gain, whether by citing unverified estimates to provide inflated figures of persons in need, displaced, killed and injured in Syria, or by delivering statements in New York and certain capitals and taking action at the United Nations to exploit the suffering of Syrians and serve the agendas of certain States that are involved in the Syrian crisis. Conversely, the United Nations and its entities active in Syria have reported on the scale their humanitarian operations and aid delivery to many hot spots. Those figures clearly confirm the extent to which the Syrian Government has cooperated with the organizations. The World Food Programme distributes food aid to 3.7 million persons a month across Syria, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees brought aid to some four million people in 2013. Those facts refute certain statements, which are divorced from reality, that question the cooperation of the Syrian Government in order to mislead international public opinion and serve the agenda of armed terrorist groups and their State sponsors. The Syrian Government insists once again that the civilian character of refugee camps in neighbouring States must be preserved, and that the needs of Syrian refugees across the border must not be exploited for political purposes.

6. In its reports on the situation in Syria, the United Nations Secretariat continues to recycle certain biased and subjective international reports for specific political ends. Syria warns of the consequences of that approach. United Nations reports on the humanitarian situation in Syria must be based on objective realities on the ground and on the United Nations country team reports. They should avoid making politicized accusations that violate international humanitarian law and human rights. The Organization must act in accordance with the United Nations resolutions that govern its work, instead of relying unilateral legal arguments.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 70 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 24 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Educational institutions vandalized and used for illicit purposes by armed terrorist groups

Governorate	*Number*
Damascus	72
Rif Dimashq	68
Dar'a	5
Qunaytirah	196
Aleppo	2 527
Homs	85
Hama	84
Idlib	76
Raqqah	33
Hasakah	31
Dayr al-Zawr	30
Ladhiqiyah	102
Total	**3 309**

Hospitals and health-care centres vandalized and rendered inactive by armed terrorist groups

Governorate	*Hospitals*	*Health-care centres*
Damascus	–	12
Rif Dimashq	6	52
Dar'a	3	37
Qunaytirah	–	19
Aleppo	6	49
Homs	2	2
Hama	1	1
Idlib	1	–
Raqqah	5	58
Hasakah	1	2
Dayr al-Zawr	7	22
Ladhiqiyah	–	8
Total	**32**	**262**

United Nations S/2014/213

Security Council

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24 March 2014

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Letter dated 21 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to send you the report of the eleventh annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council, which was held on 21 and 22 November 2013 at the Greentree Foundation in Manhasset, New York (see annex). The final report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House Rule under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

On the basis of the very positive feedback we have received from the participants each year, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland hopes that the report will contribute to a better understanding of the complexity of the work of the Council.

I should be grateful, accordingly, if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jarmo **Viinanen**
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

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Annex to the letter dated 21 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

"Hitting the ground running"

21 and 22 November 2013
Greentree Foundation
Manhasset, New York

The Government of Finland, in cooperation with Professor Edward C. Luck and the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, convened the eleventh annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council on 21 and 22 November 2013.

The annual workshops serve two essential functions. First and foremost, they help to familiarize the newly elected members with the practice, procedure and working methods of the Security Council so that they are in a position to "hit the ground running" when they join the Council the following January. That is the founding and sustaining mandate of the workshops. Second, and increasingly evident over time, the series also provides current members with a uniquely valuable opportunity to reflect on their work in an informal and interactive setting.

The opening dinner on 21 November featured a welcome address by Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen, the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations, a keynote address by Justice Louise Arbour, President and Chief Executive Officer of the International Crisis Group, and closing remarks by Ambassador Liu Jieyi, the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations and President of the Security Council for the month of November 2013.

The full-day programme on 22 November included three round-table sessions that focused on the following themes:

I. State of the Security Council 2013: taking stock and looking ahead

II. Working methods and subsidiary bodies

III. Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2013.

Opening dinner

In her keynote address, Louise Arbour addressed a series of institutions and ideas that have helped shape contemporary thinking about how to maintain international peace and security. These included international criminal justice, the responsibility to protect, peacekeeping, the rule of law, and women and peace and security. She contended that some of these ideas and institutions had fallen short, some were in disarray and others were in flux.

Justice Arbour credited the Security Council with reviving the notion of international criminal justice half a century after Nuremberg, when it established the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and with maintaining it through its interactions with the International Criminal Court (ICC). Yet the tension between peace and justice remained no matter how many times the mantra that there can be no lasting peace without justice was repeated. She commented that the referrals

from the Council to ICC to date have not accomplished much and questioned whether a referral of the Syrian situation to ICC would contribute to the prospects for a negotiated transition of power there. Noting that three of the permanent members of the Council are not States parties to the Rome Statute, she contended that this raised questions about equality before the law, the power of ICC and the deterrent effect of Council referrals to it. Arguing against a deferral of the Kenya case, she declared that the immunity of heads of State should not be extended to those who were indicted before coming to power.

Turning to the principle of the responsibility to protect, Justice Arbour observed that its initial focus on the responsibility of the State had shifted to an emphasis on responsibility to protect's sharp edge of timely and decisive international response to State failure through coercive action by the Security Council. That shift had left the principle hostage to politics within the Council. There had been much criticism of the employment of responsibility to protect for the sake of regime change in Libya; yet, proponents and critics of responsibility to protect needed to come to grips with the fact that it is hard to protect populations from a murderous leader without regime change. Though it was too early to predict the future path of responsibility to protect, she noted that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic suggested that neither our institutions nor our principles were living up to the imperatives of our times.

In terms of peacekeeping, she noted that too often host Governments had proven to be part of the problem. In the Central African Republic, for instance, international military support for the new leaders should be matched by pressure for reform so that the plight of the population could be eased. Peacekeeping was not a substitute for political reform. There was little doubt, however, that robust rules of engagement and the use of force could make a difference in some cases, as illustrated by the success of the intervention brigade in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was essential that civilian casualties be minimized and that United Nations forces not become the strong arm of weak Governments.

Commenting that the rule of law was her pet issue, Justice Arbour underscored the extensive work done by the International Crisis Group on the need to build rule-of-law institutions in fragile States. International attention, however, tended to focus more on elections than on sustaining the legislative work of parliaments. The rule of law should be understood as more than security sector reform and law enforcement, as essential as these may be. Observing that democratic Governments facing the guillotine of re-election might find it difficult to think about the long term, she commented that, within the Security Council, it might be the permanent members that would have to exercise leadership on rule of law issues.

According to Justice Arbour, the Security Council, through its resolution 1325 (2000), had accomplished a great deal, including putting the question of women and peace and security on the map. Yet its dual emphasis on the victimization of women in armed conflict and on the role of women in peacemaking reflected an idealized view of women as either victims or angels, overlooking their partisan roles supporting particular political or social agendas. When the dealmakers were those with weapons, bringing women to the table might simply reinforce the stereotype that women address just soft issues. In the Arab uprisings, for instance, women activists needed to be supported in their dual roles both as women and as engaged citizens. One should be vigilant, she continued, to avoid perpetuating stereotypes,

such as referring to "innocent" women and children when the description was not apt.

In closing, Justice Arbour contrasted the dazzling technological progress of recent years with the inertia that grips so many key national and international institutions. She urged the participants to overcome the pervasive fatigue that discourages innovation and fresh thinking in key international institutions, beginning with the Security Council. Following the keynote address, there was a lively and interactive discussion among the participants.

Ambassador Liu Jieyi, in his capacity as President of the Security Council, made closing remarks. He thanked the Government of Finland warmly for its longstanding support for the "Hitting the ground running" workshops. The workshops, in his view, provided a good platform for stocktaking, brainstorming and networking.

Ambassador Liu commented that the issues addressed by the Security Council had become more global and more interrelated. The Council had been effective both in dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security in many regions and in considering broader thematic issues. The goal was to make the Council better at addressing both sets of questions. He urged the participants to recognize that the issues before the Council were part of a wider web of issues, some of which related to the work of other United Nations bodies. The Council, he concluded, should focus on addressing those issues it had been set up to deal with, delegating other matters to other United Nations organs.

Session I
State of the Security Council 2013: taking stock and looking ahead

Moderator:

Ambassador Sylvie Lucas
Permanent Representative of Luxembourg

Commentators:

Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana
Permanent Representative of Rwanda

Ambassador Samantha Power
Permanent Representative of the United States of America

Issues covered in session I included:

- In 2013, where is the Council most/least successful in helping to maintain international peace and security? Why? When has unity within the Council been the easiest/most difficult to obtain? Why? How does its record in 2013 compare with that in 2012 or in earlier years?
- In terms of the Syrian Arab Republic, why was unity possible in achieving resolution 2118 (2013), but eluded the Council previously? What does this experience suggest about the prospects for sustaining some degree of unity in the search for peace and justice in the Syrian Arab Republic in the year ahead?

Could the Council play a more substantial role in supporting, facilitating and encouraging efforts to achieve peace in the Syrian Arab Republic?

- What operational challenges are likely to face the Council as it works with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations in verifying and destroying the chemical weapons of the Syrian Arab Republic?
- Could more be done to stem the humanitarian calamity in and around the Syrian Arab Republic? What human protection challenges are likely to arise as the conflict continues there, and is there more that the Council could do to discourage serious human rights violations by various actors in the Syrian Arab Republic?
- What more could be done to decrease the flow of weapons from Libya to both North Africa and the Middle East? What lessons could be drawn from that situation in terms of continuing Council oversight of country situations in which it has been engaged?
- How much encouragement should be drawn from the improving security conditions in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo? Are they sustainable?
- Where else has the Council achieved relatively good results in 2013: Mali? Kenya? Somalia? Other situations?
- How is the situation in the Central African Republic likely to evolve in the coming months? Are additional measures needed?
- How is the concept of Integrated Peacebuilding Offices, as in the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau, faring in practice? Should this approach be encouraged elsewhere?
- During 2013, has the Council done better than in the past at anticipating crises and taking timely preventive action? Have the efforts to enhance the Secretariat capacity for early warning and preventive diplomacy been helpful in that regard? Have the channels for alerting the Council worked well? What further steps should be considered?
- How might collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements, such as the African Union, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the League of Arab States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), be improved? What about the relationship of the Council with the International Criminal Court?
- Given the continuing involvement of the Council with a number of major thematic issues, such as women and peace and security, children and armed conflict, and justice, rule of law and impunity, how should the results of these engagements be assessed? Could these efforts be linked more organically with the Council's situation-specific work and the overall goal of maintaining international peace and security? Is more operational follow-up needed?
- Looking ahead, what are the most consequential geopolitical, resource, environmental, demographic and strategic challenges to the Council agenda likely to be?

Assessment of the performance of the Security Council in 2013

A number of participants identified situations and issues on which the Security Council performed relatively well or poorly in 2013. Many commented that, on balance, the Council had done reasonably well in maintaining international peace and security over the course of the year, despite deep and persistent divisions on some prominent issues. There had been little disagreement about what the balance sheet looked like or about which situations belonged on which side of the ledger. One speaker suggested that over the years the "Hitting the ground running" workshops had become the Council's informal end of the year wrap-up session.

According to one interlocutor, the efforts of the Council had been relatively successful in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Yemen and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In the latter situation, the Council had responded quickly and in unison to the missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, adopting strengthened sanctions. The mandate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo had been made more robust, with more of an emphasis on the protection of civilians, while a more holistic approach had been adopted for Mali. Noting that lessons should be learned from the successes and failures of the Council, another speaker commented on why the transition in Yemen was proceeding so much more smoothly than the one in Libya. In Yemen, a skilful United Nations mediator, backed by a relatively small international presence on the ground, had managed to engage the key stakeholders in a sustained dialogue with strong and consistent political support from the Security Council. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the participant continued, the Council had been willing to adjust its approach and to try something new, while in Mali, as elsewhere in Africa, France was playing a leading role and several African States had been willing to provide essential forces. In agreeing that Mali belonged on the list of relative successes, several commentators commended the critical roles played by both France and neighbouring countries, such as Morocco. One speaker commended the Council not only for its work in Mali, where the holding of elections had been an encouraging step, but also for its larger efforts to stem the spread of terrorism in North Africa.

Another participant added two more situations to the column of relative successes during 2013. One was the quick and unanimous efforts of the Council to identify new troop contributors for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan, which was facing a crisis stemming from the violence in and refugee flows from the Syrian Arab Republic. The second was the action of the Council, expressed in resolution 2107 (2013), to place the remaining issues between Iraq and Kuwait under the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), thus moving them away from Chapter VII obligations and towards eventual removal from the Council agenda altogether. That experience had underscored the need for a sunset clause or exit strategy for peace operations, such as those that had largely completed their work in West Africa. The only two issues taken off the Council agenda in the last four years, according to the speaker, had been Nepal and Timor-Leste, while many new ones had been added.

The Council also had made progress in 2013 on some thematic issues, according to several interlocutors. Commenting that there had been more highs than lows on thematic issues in 2013, a participant stated that the Council had reaffirmed its concern for the protection of civilians by issuing several related resolutions and presidential statements. The presidential statement on children and armed conflict

had restored the Council's unity on that subject, which had been mainstreamed into several situation-specific resolutions as well. More could be done, continued this speaker, to deploy child protection advisers, to use all of the tools at the disposal of the Council and to engage armed groups on these issues. Noting that two resolutions had been adopted on women and peace and security (resolutions 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013)), that delegate had disagreed with the comments made by Louise Arbour at the opening dinner that women have been stereotyped as either victims or angels. The peacekeeping strategies of the Council had also been enhanced by the efforts of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, by a thematic resolution (resolution 2086 (2013)) and by the multi-dimensional approaches to the peacekeeping deployments, including the appropriate employment of peace enforcement mandates, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see resolution 2098 (2013)) and Mali (see resolution 2100 (2013)). Agreeing that thematic debates could be useful, another commentator suggested that simply talking about such issues was not enough. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, for instance, should be empowered to advise the Council as a whole on conflict situations in the region.

Several speakers identified situations that remained challenges for the Council and should not yet be classified as failures or successes. In the view of one delegate, three seminal tests before the Council at this point were Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia. As a failed State, the Central African Republic might be in a pre-genocide phase. Agreeing that the Central African Republic was a failed State, a participant labelled the situation there an unfolding tragedy. Though grateful for the French efforts to stabilize the situation, the Council as a whole would be judged by whether it could raise its game there. Earlier attempts within the Council to draw attention to developments in the Central African Republic, asserted another speaker, had been diverted by concerns over the ongoing crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Though the Republic of South Sudan was far from being a success story, a commentator contended that the Council was beginning to be more assertive and to call on the Government to meet its responsibilities in the wake of increasing reports of atrocities, harassment and growing displacements. The time for giving the South Sudanese the benefit of the doubt had to end. It was a situation in which the voice of concern of the Security Council could make a real difference. Another challenge for the Council, continued the speaker, would be in Afghanistan, where the mandate and mission of the United Nations may have to be adjusted as the international security presence wound down. A participant, referring to Professor Luck's background paper, contrasted how the Council had decided to act in two of the most challenging situations before it: the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Syrian Arab Republic. In the former case, the Council had chosen to be innovative and to take a calculated risk by authorizing enforcement action, with encouraging results.

Several interlocutors identified the Syrian Arab Republic and the Central African Republic as the most prominent failures of the Council. One called the Syrian Arab Republic the defining challenge for the Council in 2014. Another asserted that, for the Council, the Syrian Arab Republic represented a profound security, political and humanitarian failure. The decisiveness with which the Council had acted on the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic stood in stark contrast to its inability to make progress on other key issues there. According to a third speaker, the Council's failure in the Syrian Arab Republic was broad-based, even systemic. It had fallen short of its 1945 promise as an instrument of politics

because it had not managed to keep the major powers engaged there in a constructive manner. After two years of intense debate, commented another delegate, the members of the Council should refrain from self-flagellation over the course of events in the Syrian Arab Republic because in reality no statement or procedural step by the Council could have resolved the conflict there. Incoming members, moreover, should be under no illusion that they would be able to fix that problem. In addition to the dynamics within the Council, an assessment would have to take into account the positions of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and its opponents, as well as those of the Syrian Arab Republic's neighbours, which were affected by arms and refugee flows. Would a Chapter VII military intervention for humanitarian purposes have been either feasible or successful? It was time to look ahead, the participant continued. Would an agreement brokered by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in Geneva be the best model to pursue? If so, could they find a way of briefing the whole Council, not just the permanent members? For instance, the lead countries could brief the President, who could in turn brief the non-permanent members.

To the assertion that there had been little that the Council could do to affect events in the Syrian Arab Republic, a speaker responded that the Council had more leverage two years ago, but it had not been able to agree on how to employ it. Things looked differently at earlier stages of the conflict, but the opportunity had been lost through Council inaction. In the view of a second participant, the most important resolution of 2013 has been resolution 2118 (2013), on chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The effect of the presidential statement on humanitarian access there should also not be underestimated. That speaker predicted that the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic would be resolved in the first half of 2014. Several delegates agreed that resolution 2118 (2013) was an important step forward.

In addition to the escalating conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and the Central African Republic, a participant suggested that the prolonged crisis in Darfur be added to the list of Council failures. A lot of money and effort had been spent there with little result, since Darfur remained a disaster zone from any perspective. A fundamental review of the Council strategy there was needed. Agreeing on the urgency of such a review, a second interlocutor commented that much had been learned from the Council mission to Darfur. For instance, the United Nations mission there appeared to be building a shopping mall and other long-term infrastructure when the mandate was for just one year. According to another participant, the situation in the Sudan and South Sudan, including the Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, had been one of the worst failures of the Council, despite much attention and effort. One speaker, expressing his country's frustration with the lack of progress towards a durable peace in the Middle East, added the postponement of peace negotiations in the region to the list of Council failures in 2013.

Several speakers suggested that the relationships of the Council with other institutions and intergovernmental bodies also required some improvement. There had been little progress in developing the relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission, in part because of institutional fears and jealousies, commented one participant. Those obstacles had prevented a more collaborative approach that would have taken advantage of the natural complementarities between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as key elements of a more comprehensive and integrated strategy. The

Peacebuilding Commission could be helpful in formulating and implementing exit strategies and should be used more by the Council. Though the evolving relationship between the Council and the International Criminal Court generated less discussion than at recent "Hitting the ground running" workshops, it was pointed out that referrals to ICC continued to be an important tool against impunity and a prominent feature of the work of the Council, the Kenya case aside. This was likely to remain the case in 2014, when 11 members of the Council would be States parties to the Rome Statute.

Though complaints about the Security Council were still heard in the General Assembly, it was pointed out that the recent discussion of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly had shown that there was great interest among the larger United Nations membership in the work of the Council. The report had demonstrated, once again, that the Council remained the most effective intergovernmental organ in the United Nations system and one of the most effective institutions in the world as a whole. Others agreed, though one underscored that, however successful the Council might be overall, the human and political costs of its mistakes could be very high, given the centrality of its mandate. The Council also faced credibility questions from publics and capitals, as its failures tended to be much more visible than its successes. Likewise, several speakers referred to the increasing pace of meetings, the expanding agenda and the growing workload of the Council, especially when compared to the 1980s. It was suggested that the Council was something of a victim of its success, as expectations of its performance had grown even, in some cases, beyond its mandate under the Charter.

Challenges ahead

According to a number of participants, the evolving and varied relationships of the Council with regional and subregional arrangements remained a conceptual and operational challenge, deserving further reflection and discussion. One question was how to enhance the effectiveness of regional and subregional arrangements; another was how to determine which organization should take the lead in each situation. In the view of one speaker, effectiveness should be the deciding factor. Another discussant, pointing out that most items on the Council agenda were country-specific and deal with Africa or the Middle East, urged the Council to take a more regional approach to resolving them. For instance, the regulation of monetary flows was undertaken nationally, but the phenomenon was global in scope. If such problems were addressed solely as national ones without a regional perspective, then the chances of just moving problems from one country to another remained high. When the Council tried to fix a problem in one country but not in other ones, then the problem was likely to reappear elsewhere. The members of the Council should give more thought to how to adopt such a regional and subregional approach to the problems on its agenda in 2014. Concurring with these points and citing similar ones in Professor Luck's background paper, a participant asserted that the Council was beginning to adopt more of a regional vision in approaching complex situations, such as in Mali, that are fuelled by region-wide problems. Transnational problems, such as poverty, disease, unequal access to basic services, and resource, food, and water shortages, could have negative effects on security across regions.

There were several references to the need for the Council to become more adept at adjusting missions to changing circumstances and to making mid-course corrections as necessary. Looking back on 2013, a discussant commented that it was

striking how hard it proved to be to make a sober assessment of what was and was not working and to make the required adjustments in either peacekeeping operations or political missions mid-stream. It should not be expected that everything would be working perfectly at mandate renewal time, yet those opportunities for careful scrutiny and fresh thinking were often missed. Likewise, the Council found it difficult to pull back missions and recast approaches that were not working. Agreeing with the need for more rigorous lessons-learned reviews, an interlocutor stressed the need to match mandates with changing conditions on the ground. The practice of undertaking Council missions to places of concern had been quite helpful in providing members with a keener sense of what was happening on the ground. However, it was not easy to be flexible in reworking complex mandates expressed in resolutions with as many as 55 operative paragraphs. Instead, the tendency had too often been to add a couple of paragraphs addressing thematic issues at renewal time.

Two speakers lamented that the Council was not more proficient at bridging operations and responding to emergencies. One commented that the United Nations simply did not know how to do such things. The Secretary-General, for instance, might warn that the situation in the Central African Republic was becoming critical. But it would take at least three months to organize and mount a peacekeeping mission there. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (Operation Artemis) and eastern Chad, the European Union mounted bridging operations long before the United Nations had an effective peacekeeping presence in either place. Are there other countries that could mount such bridging operations? That was a matter on which the United Nations Secretariat and the other partners of the Council should reflect. Concurring on the need for greater flexibility in emergency situations, another participant emphasized the need for closer monitoring, greater accountability and a system of checks and balances within the United Nations system when it came to peacekeeping operations. The Council needed accountability from the Secretariat and from the people deployed in the field to run these operations. Praising resolution 2098 (2013) on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the speaker asked why it had taken so many years and the outlay of many billions of dollars to produce such a sensible approach to the persistent problems there?

There was considerable discussion of the shortage of human and material resources for mounting multiple peacekeeping operations and the dearth of quality leadership in the field and expertise on military affairs within the Council itself. Cautioning that the annual cost of peacekeeping could cross the $8 billion threshold in 2014, a speaker warned of a potential shortfall both of troops from hard-pressed troop-contributing countries and of funding from the major donors. It would be unfortunate if those constraints prevented an effective response to the growing crisis in the Central African Republic. The only choice was to optimize the employment of scarce resources, reconfiguring some missions and curtailing others that had not been effective or were no longer needed. Citing the expansion of the number of peacekeeping operations in recent years, another participant questioned whether missions were necessary in so many places simultaneously. The overall cost was not unreasonable for a deployed force of 120,000 troops, commented a third speaker, though the scale of assessments was skewed and it was hard to understand why so many battalions were needed for what were largely monitoring and observation missions. Too often, relevant language skills were lacking, the battalion offices were not open on a 24-hour basis, there was inadequate utilization of modern technology

and local infrastructure could not support the international operations. The number of civilians deployed with the missions — some 30,000 — seemed excessive, but the Secretariat, not the Council, controlled that matter. For instance, there were 150 staff assigned to public relations in Juba and almost 3,000 civilians in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan overall.

A discussant argued that the shift in tactics in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo demonstrated how important it was to have dynamic force commanders and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General on the ground in difficult missions. The critical factor, another speaker agreed, was not the number of troops but the quality of their leadership. That was where the Council and Secretariat should focus their efforts. Yes, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and force commanders played a critical role, responded a third commentator, but the members of the Council were their bosses and should ensure that they were accountable.

According to one speaker, the Council should reflect more on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations it authorized. Yet, it lacked military expertise and was mandated to make military decisions without proper military advice. The members lacked critical information and the reports they receive were sanitized. How were Council members to judge, for instance, whether what they were doing in the Central African Republic made any sense from a military perspective? Some had cautioned against the militarization of the Council on the grounds that it should not become another North Atlantic Treaty Organization; yet, the Council was conducting real military operations in Mali, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and, potentially, in the Central African Republic. It was true, commented another delegate, that the diplomats serving on the Council were generally civilians with little military expertise or direct knowledge of what was happening in the field. They had little choice but to take reports from the Secretariat at face value, even though they had no assurance that the Secretariat itself was well informed. Nevertheless, the Council's flawed system for making decisions was a better alternative than total anarchy or unilateral action by the powerful.

There was a lively discussion of ways to increase the input of military professionals into the deliberations of the Council. Whether one called it intelligence or information, several delegates agreed, the Council needed fuller, more reliable and timelier information on security developments and options in key situations. One speaker noted that the Military Staff Committee had had a productive discussion on the security situation in Mali, that their delegation had benefitted from meetings with the force commander in South Sudan, and that the annual meeting of the Secretary-General with the United Nations force commanders might offer a promising opportunity for their interaction with the members of the Security Council. Several participants agreed that it would be very helpful for the Council to have an open meeting with the force commanders when they came to New York to meet with the Secretary-General. Concurring, an interlocutor suggested that the relevant force commanders also participate, by video teleconference if necessary, when the Council and/or troop-contributing countries met with Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. It was suggested by another participant that it might be appropriate to include police commissioners as well in such briefings, and others concurred. In conclusion, it was agreed, as three outcomes of the eleventh "Hitting the ground running" workshop, that (a) a meeting of the force

commanders with the members of the Security Council would be arranged annually in June when they came to New York to see the Secretary-General; (b) a similar session would be held with police commissioners when they visited New York in November; and (c) it would become regular practice to have force commanders participate by video teleconference when Special Representatives of the Secretary-General briefed the Council. Such productive outcomes, commented one speaker, were very much in the tradition of the Finnish workshops.

The discussion of how the Council could be more effective at conflict prevention was more mixed. Several speakers asserted that the Council should focus more on preventing conflict than on simply managing it. One contended that the core mandate of the Council was to prevent conflict, not to manage it through peacekeeping or conflict resolution. In response, a discussant asserted that Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Special Envoys of the Secretary-General were best placed to do conflict prevention because they were on the ground and had the best access to key actors and crucial information. It was the role of the Council to give them firm and consistent political support and to ensure that they had all the resources they needed to do effective prevention. Some participants commended horizon-scanning briefings of the Council as a useful preventive measure, while others disputed their utility. One agreed that they could sometimes be useful, but that care should be taken not to stigmatize some developing countries through such briefings. Another called them "forced", as were the monthly wrap-up sessions. Others found the monthly wrap-up sessions to be productive. According to another discussant, the "Hitting the ground running" workshops were already serving as an informal year-end review, while the retreat with the Secretary-General in April could become more strategic. That would permit twice-yearly review and horizon-scanning sessions, which should be sufficient. Whatever one thought of horizon-scanning sessions, a delegate responded, the key was to find a pattern of briefings, meetings and retreats that would permit the Council to be more strategic and reflective in the way it approaches its important mandate.

Relationships among members of the Council

As in past workshops, there was substantial discussion of the relationship between non-permanent and permanent members of the Council and their respective roles in the decision-making process (also see the summary of discussion in session III below). One participant suggested that, from the perspective of an elected member, two conditions were essential for the Council to succeed in maintaining international peace and security: (i) unity among the five permanent members; and (ii) the Council's collective understanding of the situation being addressed. In the Syrian Arab Republic and the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea, the critical negotiations had been carried out by the two most influential and interested members, with the other members largely excluded. Resolution 2118 (2013) was an important step forward, but it was basically the product of two permanent members, with little input from the rest of the membership. Sometimes one of the permanent members would cast a veto, as on the Syrian Arab Republic, effectively circumventing the will of the majority of Council members. Nevertheless, the 10 non-permanent members could make a difference on some issues when they acted together. Members from the region being addressed could bring special insights, so there should be more regular attention to their viewpoints, as well as to those of other Member States from the region that were not currently serving on the

Council. A second interlocutor agreed that there should be better ways of hearing the views and perspectives of non-Council members with special expertise (such as Italy on Libya) in informal discussions with the members of the Council, because there may not always be the right mix of countries on the Council as a crisis emerged.

Citing the initiative by Australia and Luxembourg that produced the presidential statement on humanitarian relief in the Syrian Arab Republic, a participant commented that, for all the inequities between the two levels of membership, it was still possible for non-permanent members to make a difference and to find productive ways to work with the permanent members. Commending that humanitarian initiative, an interlocutor commented that it was sobering to see how little had changed on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic. Though Council decisions were binding on all Member States under Article 25 of the Charter, there were limits to the capacity of the Council to change realities on the ground. According to one participant, non-permanent members could voice their concerns about crisis situations, while the permanent ones had the power to do something about it and to hold the parties accountable. While all countries had interests, added another speaker, the Council worked best when the permanent members did not put their national interests first and when they demonstrated some flexibility. In response, a delegate pointed out that, while Council members had national perspectives, they all needed to recognize that in the long run justice reinforces peace, though in the short run that may not be so, as Justice Arbour had underscored in her remarks the previous evening. For instance, both permanent and non-permanent members of the Council could be faced with difficult choices about whether to intervene when people take to the streets to oppose a brutal dictator.

It was pointed out that the world had vested huge powers in the Security Council and expected it to make things happen. Yet, was is not omnipotent or universally effective, responded another interlocutor, who cited Palestine, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea as situations in which powerful actors exerted their influence outside of the Council. The Security Council nevertheless was the most effective international institution because of (a) its law-making capacity; (b) its tools for implementing its decisions; (c) its successful track record in dealing with a number of specific situations; and (d) the efficiency with which it conducts its business. The challenge for the Council, noted a third discussant, was that its mandate under the Charter was very broad, yet its powers were much more limited than its authority. Of course, realpolitik was part of the Council's existence, yet it should not be used by non-permanent members as an excuse for inaction when they had opportunities to negotiate and work with the permanent members. It was no longer the 1960s, a speaker reminded the participants, when the major powers could generally get their way. There were many players now, including non-State actors and regional powers, to complicate crises such as in the Syrian Arab Republic. Yes, agreed another participant, agreement among the five permanent members was often not sufficient to dictate an outcome in an increasingly complex world, though it could be a necessary condition.

In closing the first session, several speakers offered reflections, insights and advice to the incoming members. The latter may be wondering, suggested one participant, how members reconcile their conviction that the Security Council was one of the world's most effective bodies with their criticisms of its apparent flaws and shortcomings. As Sir Winston Churchill had said of democracy, it was the worst

form of government except for all of the others. After spending time on the Council, one might approach reform ideas with greater caution, for fear that they would end up reducing the effectiveness of the Council. The new members should keep their expectations in check, according to several discussants, in order to avoid unnecessary frustration. In the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, they might not be able to end the conflict, but the Council could still make an important contribution to the stability of the region. According to another participant, serving on the Council was a unique and vivid life experience that altered the way one saw the world. There was too much mystique about consultations, cautioned one delegate, while another declared that the greatest disappointment was that the members never had this kind of candid and interactive dialogue in New York. It just never happened. The spirit of the discussion at the workshops should be transplanted to the regular deliberations of the Council.

Session II
Working methods and subsidiary bodies

Moderator:

Ambassador Oh Joon
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea

Commentators:

Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval
Permanent Representative of Argentina

Ambassador Gary Francis Quinlan
Permanent Representative of Australia

Issues covered in session II included:

- What have been the major refinements in Council working methods since the last "Hitting the ground running" workshop held a year ago? Of the changes suggested at that point, which have and have not been adopted? Why or why not? Has the political momentum behind reforms in the working methods of the Council grown, remained at about the same level or ebbed?

- In the months leading up to the open debate of the Council on its working methods, several important documents, such as the note by the President of the Security Council of 28 August 2013 (S/2013/515), the annex to the letter dated 16 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the Secretary-General (S/2013/613) and the note by the President of the Security Council of 28 October 2013 (S/2013/630), drew attention to a number of areas in which more progress could be made. Which of these issues should get the most immediate and urgent attention and which should be treated as longer-term goals?

- Likewise, have the measures set out in the annex to document S/2010/507 been fully implemented? Are there steps that have been agreed but not yet carried out consistently in practice?

- Can more be done to improve relations between the Council and other United Nations and non-United Nations organs, such as the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the International Criminal Court, which are addressing issues of importance to the Council and to the maintenance of international peace and security?
- Can more be done to make informal consultations more informal and more interactive — one of the prime areas of discussion at the last several workshops?
- Is the system of penholders working as it should? Are there recent examples of where it has worked especially well or sub-optimally? In its February 2013 monthly forecast, the Security Council Report noted that the penholders and Chairs of the relevant subsidiary bodies rarely coincide. Is this something about which we should be concerned?
- Are there ways to make the process of selecting the Chairs of subsidiary bodies and the penholders more transparent and more interactive? How might newly elected members be more fully briefed about the expectations and workload associated with heading the various subsidiary bodies?
- Has the use of video teleconferencing, of briefings by a wider range of Secretariat officials, of less formal settings for discussing emerging issues, of the enhanced Council web site and of the monthly horizon briefings improved the basis for Council decisions? Which of these steps have proven most useful and which could be improved?
- Has the effort to adjust reporting and mandate cycles, as discussed at the last two workshops, rationalized the workload and produced efficiencies? Could more be done along these lines?
- Should the members of the Council be concerned about its public reputation at this point? Has its credibility been damaged by the widely publicized disagreements among its members on the Syrian Arab Republic and some other matters?

Assessment of progress on reforming working methods

There was wide agreement that significant progress had been made on reforming the working methods of the Council, though that effort remained a work in progress. One speaker contrasted the opportunities for fresh ideas and further movement in this area with the prolonged debate over the composition of the Council in which it seemed that every possible proposal had been aired and discussed without agreement among the Member States. Several participants contended that the Council had proven itself to be the most flexible and adaptable of the United Nations inter-governmental organs. The process of improving working methods had served the larger goal of making the Council more effective, as well as efficient, in carrying out its core mandate of maintaining international peace and security. As one delegate put it, this was a question not of what the Council does, but of how it does it.

Several interlocutors affirmed that there had been significant progress on achieving greater transparency regarding the work of the Council. Among the steps cited were the holding of more open meetings than private consultations, the

convening of more Arria-formula meetings to provide direct interactions with experts, the provision of more opportunities for the President of the Council to speak to the media, the holding of more wrap-up sessions and briefings to regional groups and a sharp increase in the number of press statements. The larger United Nations membership, while often criticizing the Council for an alleged lack of transparency, should take more advantage of these opportunities, as attendance at those events varied in both level and size. Agreeing that there had been progress on transparency, one discussant cautioned that the Council could make a greater effort to take the views of those delegations that attend its open debates into account in its deliberations. A particular effort should be made to listen to the voices of countries from the region in question. In addition to enhancing transparency, one speaker called for the Council to be more interactive in its dealings with Member States that were not on the Council. For instance, when their presidency held an open debate, many proposals were articulated by non-members of the Council that deserved careful consideration. Perceptions about whether the Council was willing to take the views of others into account mattered. Also, in that regard, it should be acknowledged that the actual number of public meetings held up to that point in 2013 was lower than for the same period last year (2012), owing to the more efficient clustering of related items.[1]

Some participants saw wrap-up sessions as a valuable transparency measure, but others were more sceptical. They provided an opportunity for engagement with countries that were not members of the Council, commented one speaker, and could be forward-looking, as well as reporting on the past month. If monthly wrap-ups were too frequent, the members could decide to have them at regular intervals. Similarly, a second discussant noted that wrap-up sessions could be part review and part preview, and held periodically, if not monthly. Doubting that wrap-up sessions were a good means of advancing transparency or of reaching a larger audience among the Member States, a speaker questioned whether their content was ever interesting or revealed anything that was not already known. Moreover, they were not interactive and the President usually had a lot to say at the beginning of the month. According to another discussant, the format of wrap-up sessions did not make them a good vehicle for the kind of deep periodic assessment that was needed of the work of the Council, but they could serve as a way of demonstrating to a wider group of Member States that the members of the Council were concerned with enhancing transparency.

According to one discussant, there were two distinct levels of transparency: (i) between the 5 permanent members and the 10 non-permanent ones; and (ii) between the Security Council and the larger United Nations membership. The Security Council website developed by the Security Council Affairs Division had been greatly improved, offering the broader United Nations membership access to the full range of the Council's work. The non-permanent members, moreover, had developed a culture of briefing their regional groups on a regular basis. So the perception that the Council was some sort of secret cabal was fading. Yet there was still substantial opaqueness when it came to the first kind of transparency, as the elected members were still not privy to what went on among the permanent members. For instance, another participant agreed that there had been considerable

[1] According to the *Highlights of Security Council Practice 2012*, published by SCAD, the aggregate number of public meetings declined from 213 in 2011 to 184 in 2012. The latter figure, however, is higher than the 174 in 2009 and 182 in 2010.

progress on most dimensions of transparency, but that did not extend to the manner in which the Chairs of subsidiary bodies were selected — a topic addressed in more detail below — which was still undemocratic and often favoured the interests of the permanent members, not the non-permanent ones, who customarily Chair the assigned committees.

It would be misleading, cautioned one speaker, to accept stereotypes that cast all permanent members as opposing further steps towards transparency and working methods reform and all non-permanent members as favouring such measures. The experience of that delegate had been more nuanced, as each permanent member had a distinct approach to these matters and some non-permanent members tended to be more passive and others pushier. After serving on the Council for half a year, the representatives of newly elected countries usually become more confident and assertive, as illustrated by the note on troop-contributing countries (S/2013/630). A second participant noted that it had proven easier to work with a permanent member than with a non-permanent one on a particular situation of concern. In the realm of requirements for peacekeeping missions, it was the Secretariat that should become more transparent, asserted another discussant. The members of the Council were handicapped in dealing with the Fifth Committee and with troop-contributing countries when they did not have full information on the financial, material and personnel requirements of a new or revamped operation.

A number of participants identified the work of the Council's Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions as the locus in recent years for efforts to improve Council working methods. A PowerPoint presentation summarized the strategies, the activities and the priorities of the Informal Working Group in 2013. According to one delegate, that was the only subsidiary body that did a good job of disseminating its work and of informing permanent representatives, not only experts, of the progress of its efforts.

Efficiency measures

A participant outlined a series of steps taken in recent years that had lowered costs and increased the efficiency of the work of the Council. Though its agenda had not contracted, the Council had managed to hold 15 per cent fewer meetings in 2013 than in 2011. Issues were clustered more productively and meetings were running longer, allowing the Council to accomplish more in fewer sessions. The utilization rate for the Council facilities, at 83 per cent, was the highest in the Organization, an indicator that suggested that the Council was the most efficient body in the United Nations. By making decisions under the silence procedure, it was easier for the Council to produce presidential statements and press statements than it was before. The expanded use of video teleconference technology had reduced travel costs for briefers, as well as providing the members with a closer feel for the dynamics on the ground. The use of informal informals, missions and other non-formal gatherings away from Headquarters had also reduced costs and encouraged dialogue among the members. The practice of keeping most Fridays free of meetings of the whole had served both as a cost-cutting measure and as way of regularizing meetings of the subsidiary bodies. Presidents had been encouraged to try to avoid voting on Mondays in order to reduce staff overtime charges on the weekends. More could be done to prepare the annual report farther in advance to similarly reduce staff costs. Efforts to spread the Council workload more evenly over the course of the year, a topic of the last few "Hitting the ground running" workshops, had increased

efficiency and eased frustrations. It was likely that the far more frequent use of the website had lowered the demand for information from the Secretariat.

An interlocutor concurred that periodicity and clustering had worked well. The time-keeping procedures for statements made in the Peace and Security Council of the African Union were worth studying for possible adoption by the Security Council. With a pre-agreed time limit (for formal meetings, not consultations), the microphones were turned off after three minutes, though the speaker could then turn it back on if needing to exceed the limit. By setting and sticking to time limits, the members of the Council could shorten meetings by as much as an hour, while increasing the chances that permanent representatives would remain for the whole meeting. Several discussants expressed general agreement with these efficiency proposals, including adopting time limits along the lines of the practice of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. One suggested that members practice restraint in their statements at formal meetings, but that one should be cautious about applying strict rules in consultations, which should be as informal and interactive as possible. A respondent agreed specifically to the idea of avoiding Monday morning voting. Another suggested that time limits be applied to those briefing the Council as well. One asked about the cost of video teleconference technology and was assured that it was quite low, especially compared to travel costs given the rules for United Nations travel.

As in past workshops, there was discussion about whether it was necessary for every delegation to speak to every issue, especially in consultations. That practice was time consuming, discouraged interactivity and reduced the quality of the debate if members felt they had to speak about issues that might be of little interest to them and on which their expertise was limited. Though there seemed to be agreement on getting away from that practice, it had proven difficult to change habits. A delegate related the experience of trying to refrain from addressing a given topic, which had led to expressions of concern from experts within that delegation, from the capital and from other Member States or civil society groups seeking support on the matter. It became news if one declined to speak even in closed consultations. That was the case even on thematic issues on which the Security Council lacked the authority to legislate or set legal norms.

Improving consultations

At the eleventh annual workshop, as at earlier ones, there was general agreement that informal consultations needed to be made more informal, consultative and interactive. Several speakers contrasted how much more productive the conversation was at the Finnish workshops than under the more sterile and less interactive format of Council consultations in New York. Calling the current system "crazy" a discussant complained that the scripted and choreographed nature of the consultations extended to the monthly lunches with the Secretary-General. It would be refreshing to just have a normal conversation with the Secretary-General about what was going on, but instead delegates ask beforehand what the topic would be so that their experts could prepare talking points in advance. Then Ambassadors felt obligated to use them, and any spontaneity was lost. There must be a better way.

Acknowledging how surprising it was that the consultations were so scripted and stiff, a participant called for doing whatever possible to free up Council consultations. Expressing similar disappointment at the lack of interactivity, a

speaker said that the consultations were much too structured and unproductive. That core reform was needed, but it was not so easy to achieve, noted another, as every representative felt compelled to prepare talking points beforehand and Governments had positions that needed to be expressed. It would help if each member showed some flexibility, listened and reacted to what others were saying, and stayed for the whole consultation.

According to another interlocutor, that had been a problem for a decade or more, and it was time to look at how the Peace and Security Council of the African Union handled consultations. Its consultations were more interactive, without monologues; the Secretariat could have an input, and then a communiqué would be worked out in the Peace and Security Council itself to give meaning to the whole exercise. At an earlier workshop, there had been discussion of the possibility of convening permanent representative-only meetings, but that idea has not been implemented. Perhaps it was worth reviving as a way of facilitating a more strategic discussion, one delegate suggested.

Two discussants pointed out that the goal of greater interactivity and transparency was undermined by the culture of leaks that pervaded even closed consultations. Representatives were not going to be candid when others were twittering about their remarks almost before they were completed. Governments were going to be sure that their official positions were adhered to under such conditions. If the consultations were going to be more productive and interactive, then the members were going to have to show more respect for the confidentiality of those discussions.

Other interlocutors emphasized the importance of the President steering consultations to the extent possible. That would be better than just giving the floor to each speaker, it was said, and the President could say a few words about the situation or theme being addressed and/or pose some questions at the outset. By summarizing at the conclusion where countries agree or disagree, the President could help to build the foundation for eventual agreement. It was helpful, according to a second delegate, to have presidents who preside actively and summarize the session at its conclusion. A third discussant urged Presidents to be bold and assertive, while being prepared to make mistakes and be criticized. That might be so, commented another participant, but it should be understood that in the Council the likelihood of members being unhappy with the way a discussion and their positions were summarized was quite high.

Prevention and horizon scanning

Though there was wide support for the notion that the Council should put more emphasis on prevention, views of the benefit of the horizon scanning exercises were mixed. It was time to do more than pay lip service to the goal of prevention, asserted a participant. The way horizon scanning briefings had been conducted could be improved and refined, but agreement should be reached in principle to holding such sessions when the Secretariat informed the Council that there was an emerging situation that needed its attention. That would be better than requiring the formal invocation of Article 99, which has not been done for many years and should be demystified. There also should be greater use of the All Other Business category in consultations. In response, a delegate agreed that the idea of horizon scanning as a preventive measure was attractive, but the format needed improvement because

the sessions were too much like informal consultations and insufficiently interactive. Though some delegations were apprehensive about the real intentions of horizon scanning sessions, added another speaker, members should recall that preventive diplomacy was a core function of the Council and the members needed to keep their eyes and ears open to emergencies in any part of the world.

Prevention and contingency planning should be seen as core roles for the United Nations system and especially for the Security Council, declared one discussant. It would be helpful in that regard, added a participant, to be more flexible both about what was on the Council agenda and about how frequently an issue was addressed. South Sudan and Mali were the only situations that had been added to the agenda in recent years, while the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon were addressed under the general heading of the situation in the Middle East. Could the addition of those two situations to the agenda be considered? Also, more attention should be given to which issues should be addressed more or less often, as the frequency with which the Council considered some matters did not seem to coincide with their urgency. An interlocutor responded that in at least one case it required meetings every two weeks until a convergence of views could be achieved, while if that situation had been addressed less frequently, say only once every two or three months, then the members would have just read statements from capitals rather than finding common ground.

Penholders and Chairs of subsidiary bodies

As in recent workshops, there was lively discussion of the question of how penholders and the Chairs of subsidiary bodies are selected. The system of appointing Chairs was still not transparent and it was controlled by the permanent members for their own purposes, contended a participant. That sometimes led to members being assigned committees in which they were not interested, though that had not been their experience. A second speaker declared that its delegation had been selected as Chair of two committees they were not interested in and on which they had no particular expertise. That meant that those groups had not been active, which was unfortunate. A delegate agreed that the closed nature of the selection process was frustrating and tended to benefit the permanent members because of their institutional memory. Steps were being taken to make the selection process more open, democratic and interactive, according to a discussant. Every committee needed a Chair, so it was not always possible to have a perfect fit in every case. Some committees entailed far more work than others. The question of capacity therefore had to be taken into account, not just the member's interests and preferences. Agreeing that the process was better in 2013, a participant said that it was more consultative. Still, it should be understood that much of the committee work constituted the sharp end of the mandate of the Council and could be quite raw. A delegation's capacities thus had to be considered, as well as its interests. Consideration might be given to the preparation of another Note on the selection process.

There were also distinct views on how it is decided which member will serve as a penholder on each topic. A delegate contended that there was only one penholder from Africa on issues regarding the continent, though those issues comprised 70 per cent of the Council agenda. Three permanent members were the penholders for most of those matters. Another speaker agreed that there should be more penholders from among the non-permanent members and the process should

be more interactive. But it should be possible to find a common denominator on that question. A respondent countered that a member should take the pen; it was not given. That was a big responsibility, added an interlocutor, and the three permanent members carried a substantial burden by undertaking that role. Their delegation had found it easy to work with the penholder on a situation of interest to it. To give all members a role, the position of alternate penholder could be added. Concurring that there had been some progress on making that determination more flexible, a participant proposed that the traditional penholders look to a non-permanent member, preferably from the region in question, for advice and expertise.

Subsidiary bodies

Of the 22 subsidiary bodies, pointed out a participant, 13 address sanctions regimes. Their work, in many ways, constituted the way the Council operationalized its decisions through monitoring, reporting and compliance measures. Since that often entailed the establishment of national implementation mechanisms, the volume of inquiries from the Member States could be very high. Some committee assignments were more demanding than others, but, in the aggregate, the subsidiary bodies produced some 600 decisions a year. Many of those decisions affected the lives of ordinary people, such as travel bans and financial restrictions, so there could be substantial civil society interest in that work. Despite the importance of the work of the subsidiary bodies, added another speaker, the members had made little use of the Council's existing agenda item on subsidiary bodies.

Though there had been some improvement recently, it was said that the incoming members still needed more guidance on what the different committees and working groups demanded of their Chairs. A delegate described the far-reaching agenda and activities of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, including its examination of new technologies. Noting that the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions had been looking at the handover of the chairmanships of subsidiary bodies, another speaker suggested that the Security Council Affairs Division consider producing manuals on the role of the Chairs, on the special requirements of heading sanctions committees and on the relative workload each subsidiary body entailed. It was pointed out by a second participant that the Security Council Affairs Division and the Security Council Report had held a half-day retreat on the work of the sanctions committees for incoming members for the last few years. The existing guidelines on the implementation of sanctions could use updating.

According to a delegate, there were operational synergies among the committees, including on the matter of how and how frequently they reported to the Council, that needed further reflection. The possibility of convening an Arria-formula meeting in 2014 to look at the work of the subsidiary bodies and cross-cutting issues affecting their work was worth consideration. If there was interest, the speaker's delegation could sponsor it.

Several participants addressed the relationship between committee Chairs and the related penholders. Coordination between the committee Chair and the penholder was both important and easy to accomplish, commented a delegate, who said that that had worked well for their situation-specific committee. Both the penholder and the Chair had a responsibility to ensure that the expertise of the

committee was reflected in draft resolutions, noted an interlocutor, and that could be a good way to bolster cooperation between non-permanent and permanent members.

There was a need to review the effectiveness of sanctions regimes, concluded a discussant. As had been suggested, it would be useful to look at the linkages among sanctions regimes. In addition, there could be cross-cutting issues between sanctions and thematic issues that needed further explication. It could be worthwhile to have Special Representatives of the Secretary-General meet with the relevant sanctions committees, as well as with the Council as a whole. When the first open briefing in three years on the sanctions regime on the Democratic People's Republic Of Korea was given earlier in 2013, the interest of Member States was quite high.

Outreach

There was more discussion of the relationship of the Council with the Peacebuilding Commission than with any other body. It was suggested that it would be useful to invite the head of the Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configuration when mandate renewals were being considered. More broadly, another participant proposed that consideration be given to including the head of the Peacebuilding Commission country configuration whenever the Council was addressing a particular situation, since that person might be closest to what was happening on the ground. Noting that the advisory role of the Peacebuilding Commission was not visible in the Council deliberations, a speaker suggested that some triangulation among the penholder, the head of the Peacebuilding Commission country-specific configuration and the country in question could be useful at times.

The paradigm for the relationship of the Council with the media, contended a participant, had not changed since the days of the cold war. The members remained apprehensive about the media and civil society, yet they were among the prime users of the outputs of the Council. It was time to become more proactive towards both the media and civil society, while avoiding being condescending. It was possible to get wide media coverage, as had been the case for the Arria-formula session on security and climate change. Agreeing that the United Nations was not good at public relations, a speaker suggested that part of the problem was the small group of reporters who had been covering the world body for too many years and part was the reluctance of members to engage with the media. A particular concern was that the work of the Organization on peace and security was not well reported or understood, and that was a matter that should be addressed as part of the effort to improve the working methods of the Council. The Secretariat, it was pointed out, regularly sent copies of press statements from the Council to 4,000 media outlets around the world. Press statements could have real value, conceded a delegate, but the members should be careful about what signals others might read into them. For instance, a press statement might imply a greater readiness to become engaged directly in a situation than actually existed.

There was less discussion of the relationship of the Council with regional and subregional arrangements than at past workshops. A discussant underscored the importance of those relationships, which should be further developed. The Council had held a productive high-level meeting on enhancing cooperation with those organizations and had also adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/16, 28 October 2013) that recognized the contribution of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to the work of the United Nations.

Session III
Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2013

Moderator:

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Commentators:

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Ambassador Abderrazzak Laassel
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Ambassador Kodjo Menan
Permanent Representative of Togo

Ambassador Gert Rosenthal
Permanent Representative of Guatemala

Reflections

All of the representatives of outgoing members spoke of their term on the Council in very positive terms. One described his country as a "satisfied customer". The term offered a fresh learning opportunity and, in some ways, a humbling experience, as there was no room for arrogance, given the challenges before the Council. To the representative of a second outgoing member, service on the Council was a "big deal" for his country, as well as a great learning experience that was personally enriching and rewarding. Having spent two "intense and productive" years on the Council, a third speaker found it to be a "unique" and "fascinating" experience. A fourth saw it as an unusual opportunity to make a significant contribution to peace and security within one's region, as well as globally. A term on the Council was not only a chance to raise the visibility of one's country globally, commented a fifth outgoing delegate; it was also a privilege and a responsibility, for there was no greater purpose for multilateral diplomacy than to maintain international peace and security. Since the work of the Council affected the lives of hundreds of millions of people, including women and children, there was a moral and political responsibility to do one's best while serving on the Council. It had been an educational and enjoyable experience, if occasionally frustrating.

The Security Council was evolving, it was said, and even in two years one could see changes in the way it operated. Unlike the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council, in the Council little time was wasted on procedural matters, as the Council had become increasingly efficient over time. Yet the reform debate was fixated on the number of permanent seats, missing the bigger picture. If the five permanent members wanted that, it might happen, but they did not. Progress on working methods reform continued to be made, commented a discussant, who praised the work of the last several Chairs of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions. But more could and should be accomplished in the coming months and years. One of the useful innovations,

according to a third delegate, had been the introduction of informal interactive dialogues by the Council. More should be convened in the future. Another speaker stressed how useful Arria-formula meetings could be for reaching out to regional organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia for a broader, deeper and more interactive discussion of an issue. The speaker's delegation had utilized Arria-formula meetings in conjunction with its presidency to good effect.

In the view of a participant, some of the evolution of the Council had been due to the changing nature of conflict, which compelled the Council to deal with increasingly complex issues, such as terrorism, asymmetric warfare and transnational organized crime. The Council had had to focus more on post-conflict transitions, an area in which its record had been mixed and would require more attention to the interaction among economic, political, security and humanitarian challenges. It had begun to test new operational paradigms, such as robust peacekeeping and the intervention brigade in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The first deployment of unmanned unarmed aerial systems — drones — would take place there soon, as a way of trying to improve situational awareness and identify emerging threats to civilians and peacekeepers. According to a second speaker, the Council needed to develop a better strategy for dealing with armed rebellions.

Assessment

The Council had achieved significant success in resolving a number of conflicts over the past two years, asserted a participant, yet the public expected the Council to resolve all conflicts, given its open-ended mandate. Though it had been relatively successful in Timor-Leste, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, the outside world focused more on its visible failures, particularly in the Syrian Arab Republic. Concurring that the expectations of both the public and Governments were rising, another diplomat cited progress over the course of 2013 in Yemen, the Sudan, South Sudan, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The latter two cases showed that military intervention was sometimes necessary to advance peace and security. The Council also had become more engaged in the worsening crisis in the Central African Republic. Despite sharp differences over some issues, the spirit of consensus still usually prevailed in the Council. In the view of a third speaker, the Council should be commended for its timely and effective response in Mali, as well as for its larger strategy towards the Sahel region. The situation in the Central African Republic was grave, but the Council was beginning to focus on it intensively. It was also encouraging that the Council was becoming more engaged with the challenges in the Arab world as a whole. In terms of Palestine, the renewal of negotiations under United States leadership might be the last chance for a durable peace, and it was to be hoped that all Council members would support the outcome. Another discussant said that the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process had been the biggest disappointment over the last two years on the Council.

Too many lives had been lost in the Syrian Arab Republic, commented a participant, and no effort should be spared to provide political support for the Geneva negotiations, given the implications of the continuing fighting for regional stability. The progress on the elimination of chemical weapons there, on the other hand, demonstrated how much was possible when the Security Council was united. Though the Council had failed to take timely and effective action on the conflict in

the Syrian Arab Republic, commented another speaker, there had been real efforts within the Council to try to find common ground. Three resolutions and a number of statements had been agreed to address the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, including both its humanitarian dimensions and efforts to eliminate chemical weapons there.

According to one speaker, of the three tracks of work of the Council — conflict prevention, peacekeeping and conflict resolution — peacekeeping had proven the most efficient. Indeed, it had become the backbone of the United Nations. Progress was being made towards the development of common doctrine, as reflected in resolution 2086 (2013). Nevertheless, the Council still faced continuing challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan, as well as severe challenges in the Central African Republic. The transition in Afghanistan would require the assistance of the Council on security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, as well as greater involvement in the humanitarian cluster, so that refugees would return to that country. The mandate renewal for UNAMA would have to be undertaken with care. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali, the Council had come to recognize that a robust response was not enough. Those situations also called for a more strategic regional approach that encompassed broader political and development concerns, with the participation of international financial and development institutions alongside the United Nations. That approach complemented the emergence of regional ownership, particularly in Africa, including the provision of peacekeepers from the region in several operations. Regional ownership might be part of the answer in the search for drawdown and exit strategies. Though concurring with that line of reasoning, another delegate pointed out that it defined a dilemma for the Council members. On the one hand, it had become commonplace to assert that the Council should focus on its core peace and security mandate, leaving peacebuilding to others, including most prominently the Peacebuilding Commission. On the other hand, experience kept demonstrating that it was impossible to make a sharp distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the implementation of Council decisions on the ground. The Council could not delegate its responsibilities to the Peacebuilding Commission, the Economic and Social Council or any other body.

A speaker also addressed a series of thematic or normative questions before the Council. Both international criminal justice and national complementarity were legitimate values, and the incoming members would need to help find a middle ground that could reconcile some of the differences that had arisen between them. The Council's persona was being redefined by the issues, such as the protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and women and peace and security, that comprise the rights cluster.

Relationships within the Council

Again and again, in many different ways, discussants spoke of the critical importance of relationships, both among members and with key stakeholders. One told the incoming members to expect a genial atmosphere, as the Council was a "comfortable" place where everyone called you by your first name. The five permanent members were generally very helpful in terms of providing support when it was needed, such as when a delegation was assuming the presidency for the first time. One could count on that assistance. Another underscored the degree to which

mutual respect and cordiality were critical to the smooth functioning of the Council. Similarly, another discussant praised the spirit of cooperation that prevailed in the Council, noting that there was a real effort to maintain good personal relationships, even when political ties are strained. The two should never be confused. The permanent members had many advantages — institutional memory, global diplomatic presence, much wider sources of information and greater capacity to help implement Council decisions, among others — but they did not display prejudice against the non-permanent members. They did not dictate what happened in the Council. They could be quite open about sharing information. They generally recognized that the non-permanent members bring essential attributes to the Council as well, such as fresh perspectives, unique experience and valuable local and regional expertise and contacts. Elected members might bring focused attention to particular thematic issues as well, including during their presidencies.

A delegate suggested that it might be best to consider the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members in a practical, dispassionate way. The privileges of permanency and veto power were conferred by the Charter. The former had permitted the permanent members to acquire a deep knowledge of issues and Council procedures. In that context, the personality of each ambassador of a non-permanent member could make a big difference. They could work for further reform of working methods, because many members were unhappy with the status quo; there were different approaches among the permanent members, and it is an ongoing process. Each non-permanent member had opportunities to exert influence, as well as an obligation to try to make a difference. In consultations, constructive proposals by non-permanent members were usually welcome and given serious consideration. When the permanent members were divided, non-permanent members could play an essential role as bridge-builders. The subsidiary bodies were becoming increasingly important and they represented opportunities for non-permanent members to contribute to issues of real significance. Non-permanent members should seek opportunities to take the pen, as the speaker's delegation did on a matter of importance to its country. There was a strong sense of collegiality among all of the representatives on the Council — whether permanent or non-permanent — and real friendships developed over one's term. With greater openness, those human relationships tended to grow.

Though the tenor of the discussion of relations between permanent and non-permanent members was generally upbeat, most speakers commented on how the two-tiered structure of the Council complicated those relationships. Terming this structure "diabolical", an interlocutor asserted that the huge asymmetries between the permanent and non-permanent members largely shaped the nature and course of decision-making within the Council. The existence of the veto power, even when not invoked, influenced how decisions were made in profound ways. The permanent presence of the five and the historical memory it provided mattered greatly, and they also had the advantage of worldwide networks of embassies, interests and partners. Those Member States that would be unhappy working in such a non-democratic arrangement should not join the Council, but that might not be the best way to view the Council and its work. There was a lot that non-permanent members could and did accomplish during their terms on the Council. Yes, it was a seriously flawed organ, but it was the only one the international community had. The only choice was to make it function as effectively as possible.

Sometimes the non-permanent members were treated as second-class citizens in the Council, commented another participant, and the Council had no mechanism for preserving their legacy once they left its ranks. It was not always appreciated

that the non-permanent members could enrich the work of the Council with their views, while the turnover of non-permanent members every year ensured a fresh set of perspectives and interests. A speaker noted that the permanent members sometimes negotiated a text without input from the elected members, who were then given a "take it or leave it" choice. Worse, there had been occasions when some of the permanent members had taken the results to the public or to other delegations before bringing them to the elected members. When one was left out of the loop like that, it was difficult to explain to one's capital. Likewise, noted another interlocutor, the permanent members were quite capable of putting pressure on one's capital to try to get their way on matters before the Council. Three participants commented on the practice of repeating previously agreed language in new draft resolutions. One saw this as a tactic by permanent members to keep language that they had agreed to in the past without taking into account changed circumstances or the views of non-permanent members that had not participated in the earlier negotiations. Another agreed that penholders sometimes used this practice to prevent change in the approach of the Council to certain issues. While acknowledging that previous language should not be considered as sacred text and should be revisited from time to time, a third discussant stressed that everyone was still bound by the language of past resolutions of the Council.

Several participants emphasized that the success of the Council depended on the achievement of consensus among the permanent members. One asserted therefore, that a key role of non-permanent members was to contribute to the consensus-building process within the Council; that was part of the collective responsibility of all members. In theory, the 10 elected members could exercise decisive influence if they worked together and took common positions. They rarely did, however, because they, like the permanent members, had their individual interests and perspectives.

Lessons learned

The outgoing members offered a rich array of lessons learned to the incoming ones. Their advice included the following points, among others:

- Take full advantage of your two years on the Council; they go by very rapidly.
- Discover a niche, identify it early and stay with it. Become the Council's source for expertise and analysis on a few questions that matter to your country, whether they are particular country situations or broader themes. Among the niches on which the outgoing members have left their mark are peacekeeping, the rule of law, the protection of civilians and peace and security in Africa, the Sahel region and the Middle East.
- There is room to pursue your own goals, but be sure you know what those are at the outset.
- Thematic debates may provide political space, as do Arria-formula meetings and informal interactive dialogues.
- Look for opportunities to make a difference; 90 per cent of the time the permanent members are in agreement and you cannot have much influence, so look for the other 10 per cent, when your voice and views will be needed and valued.
- Work on personal relationships at many levels: within the Council; with non-members of the Council; with regional groups; with other United Nations

organs; within one's mission; with one's capital and ministry; with the United Nations Secretariat; and with the media, NGOs and civil society. They all matter. Maintaining productive interactions with so many layers of stakeholders is the essence of multilateral diplomacy.

- Keep your doors open to NGOs, especially if you have a small mission.
- Coordinate closely and frequently with other Council members from your region. Brief the incoming members from your region, in part to try to ensure some degree of continuity.
- Get to know the Secretariat at many levels. Depend on it for experienced advice, especially as your presidency is approaching. It is the bedrock of the Organization. Look especially to the Security Council Affairs Division for unparalleled expertise and institutional memory.
- The success of a Permanent Representative will be largely determined by the quality of staff work in that Mission. Get well trained and experienced staff, and prepare well in advance, as the work of the Council is unique.
- Select your experts carefully and monitor their work regularly, because there is a tendency for policy to be made from the bottom up. Ambassadors generally do not negotiate texts, yet they are responsible for the faithful implementation of national policy. Rarely do the Permanent Representatives meet as a group.
- Communicate regularly and coordinate closely with your ministry, in part to give less room for other members to engage in splitting tactics.
- Prepare well in advance for your presidencies and work closely with capitals on them, especially if there will be high-level events.
- Accept offers of information from the permanent members — they can be useful — but seek alternative sources of information as well. Look to regional organizations, think tanks, NGOs and the Secretariat. The Security Council Report is an especially helpful source.
- Keep up your ties with the larger United Nations membership through regional groups and bilaterally. Soon you will be rejoining them.
- Brief your regional group regularly and frequently. Try to reflect regional views. But remember that under the Charter members of the Council are elected individually, not as representatives of regions.
- Avoid cynicism — one of the permanent members claimed to have that monopoly — and embrace collegiality.

One participant spoke of seeming paradoxes: that for all of the flaws and inequities of the Council, all of the outgoing members considered their terms on the Council to be quite productive and, on balance, a positive experience. While the larger United Nations membership tended to be quite critical of the Council, it was very eager to become elected members. As long as those paradoxes held, the impetus for reforming the composition of the Council would fall short. Based on the experience of the past two years, that speaker would be more cautious in the future about favouring deep reforms to the Council for fear of doing harm to its important work.

United Nations A/ES-10/622–S/2014/214

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 March 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 24 March 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

We are at a critical stage in the resumed Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Although serious efforts are being exerted internationally, regionally and by the Palestinian leadership to advance the process, Israel, the occupying Power, persists in bad faith, in both word and deed, aggravating the volatile situation on the ground and threatening the viability of the process. Public confidence in and support for the negotiations, as well as the credibility of the process itself, are being dramatically eroded by incessant Israeli violations against the Palestinian people. Indeed, such illegal Israeli actions appear deliberately intended to provoke the Palestinian people, undermine the Palestinian leadership and destabilize the situation, with potentially far-reaching negative consequences.

On Saturday 22 March 2014, the Israeli occupying forces perpetrated another three extrajudicial killings. In a violent, pre-dawn military raid on the Jenin refugee camp, occupying forces killed three Palestinian men. Although claiming they were undertaking an "arrest operation", the occupying forces used lethal force, killing Hamza Abu Al-Haija, age 22, Mahmoud Abu Zeina, age 17, and Yazan Jabarin, age 22, injuring at least 10 other Palestinian civilians, and causing widespread fear and anger throughout the camp, which has been brutally targeted by the occupation in the past, including in April 2002, when occupying forces brutally massacred at least 55 Palestinians in the camp. In this regard, we recall that the wilful killing of civilians by the occupying Power amounts to war crimes under international humanitarian law, particularly article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding grave breaches.

In recent days, dozens of Palestinian civilians have also been injured by the Israeli occupying forces in military raids in the Aida refugee camp, north of Bethlehem, and in the village of Silwad, north of Ramallah. Civilians also continue to be the victims of vicious Israeli settler violence. In the recent period, this has

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included, inter alia, an attack by a gang of settlers on two Palestinian children, both 11 years old, near the village of Beit Furik, east of Nablus, on 20 March; an attack by settlers on Palestinian farmers working in their fields near the village of Burin, south of Nablus, on 23 March; and the killing of a 70-year old Palestinian man, Saleh Malihat, who was run over by a settler on 2 March near the city of Ramallah. We recall here the obligations of the occupying Power, in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, to ensure the protection of the civilian population under its occupation and reiterate our calls for an end to such brutality against the Palestinian people.

Further inflaming tensions, Israel has continued unabated with its illegal and destructive settlement campaign throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. In addition to the announcements of the construction of the more than 1,000 settlement units referred to in our letter of 20 March 2014 (A/ES-10/621-S/2014/205), the Israeli Government has approved plans for the advancement of more than 2,200 other units in six Israeli settlements, including in the settlements of "Beit El" and "Ariel", deep in the West Bank. These actions are being undertaken in direct and grave breach of international law, which deems all such colonization activities to be illegal, and in total contradiction to the objectives of the peace process, reaffirming Israel's bad faith and intentions in this regard.

If implemented, such illegal measures would further fragment the contiguity of the Occupied State of Palestine, seriously jeopardizing the viability of the two-State solution based on the pre-1967 borders and sabotaging the small window of opportunity before us for achieving a final, just and peaceful solution to this conflict. We once again draw the international community's attention to the dangers of this situation and call for the exertion of all efforts to salvage the prospects for peace, including by the Security Council according to its duty under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The international community must unequivocally demand that Israel, the occupying Power, cease all of its illegal actions against the Palestinian people. Israel must be compelled to abide by its obligations under international law, without exception, and by its commitments in the peace process, the terms of reference of which have been repeatedly reaffirmed and endorsed by the international community. Continued Israeli provocations and aggression can only further destabilize the situation on the ground, negating current peace efforts, with perilous ramifications. We thus reiterate our call at this critical time for urgent efforts to de-escalate tensions, to responsibly support the political process, and to salvage the chances for realizing peace.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 490 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 20 March 2014 (A/ES-10/621-S/2014/205) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feda **Abdelhady-Nasser**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/68/809–S/2014/215

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 March 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 21 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 18 March 2014 addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit **Çevik**
Permanent Representative

14-27745 (E) 280314

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Annex to the letter dated 21 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 27 January 2014 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/68/719-S/2014/56), which contains allegations of "illegal and provocative activities by the Turkish air force" within "Cyprus's national airspace and the Nicosia FIR". In this connection, I have the honour to bring to your kind attention the following.

Flights of Turkish aircraft inside the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full permission and knowledge of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. The civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the only competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace.

The flights of Italian military GLF-3 aircraft have taken place without prior knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and thus constitute a clear violation of the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus over its airspace. Needless to say, these flights also created a serious risk for the safety of navigation of civilian aircraft in the region.

The flights of Italian military aircraft that have taken place without the prior knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have been duly protested by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a letter dated 9 January 2014 addressed to the Italian Embassy in Nicosia (South). The said letter includes the details pertaining to the time, altitude and coordinates of the flights in question. It is noteworthy that violations of the national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by Italian military aircraft were recorded on 23 and 30 October and 11, 14 and 15 November 2013, respectively. In the face of these developments and upon the request of relevant authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkish military aircraft undertook preventive action in accordance with international rules in order to identify aircraft violating the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

There can be no doubt that in the event of the violation of the national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, similar preventive measures will be taken in exercise of the sovereign rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

As noted in our previous letters, Greek Cypriot assertions on so-called airspace violations and "interference with civilian and military aircraft" are based on the false and illegal claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot administration extends over the whole island, including the territory and national airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely, the existence of two sovereign, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory and airspace.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to put on record, in view of the resumption of talks, that the Turkish Cypriot side is fully committed to finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, namely, a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island and within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two Constituent States of equal status. It is our considered view that if our sincere and constructive approach is reciprocated by the Greek Cypriot side, a long-overdue settlement of the Cyprus problem is achievable in the shortest possible time.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

United Nations S/2014/216

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 24 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the observations of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) for the period from 14 November 2013 to 27 February 2014 (S/2014/130).

1. The Syrian Arab Republic remains committed to cooperating with Lebanon in order to ensure respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the two kindred countries, and thereby foster the security and stability of both countries, avoid undermining each other's national security or stability, and achieve the supreme interests of both countries.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic recalls that Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) was adopted as a result of Israel's military aggression against Lebanon. Accordingly, the Secretary-General's reports should conform to the mandate set out in the resolution, instead of deviating from its primary objective. It is surprised that the Secretary-General persists in mentioning Syria in his reports on the implementation of the resolution, including by making reference to matters that are outside the resolution's scope, such as the question of displaced Syrians in Lebanon, and by addressing matters that pertain to the national sovereignty of both countries, such as the demarcation of their borders.

3. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic rejects Israel's inflammatory claims concerning the smuggling of weapons from Syria to certain political actors in Lebanon. Those claims are meant to achieve political aims that are known to all. What is surprising, however, is the insistence of some individuals at the United Nations that such malicious allegations should be included in the Secretary-General's reports, although it is acknowledged that the allegations cannot be investigated. This is a stark and puzzling contradiction in the position of the United Nations Secretariat. What is even more puzzling is that the Secretariat should include allegations that Hizbullah is intervening in Syria and ignore the fact that Lebanese political movements are openly sponsoring, protecting and supporting the takfirist terrorist groups that are active in many parts of Lebanon. Those movements are also providing the terrorists with political and logistical support, and that has enabled them to turn those areas into a rear base for terrorist groups that are active in areas next to the Lebanese border.

4. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that it is important for the Security Council and the reports of the Secretary-General to avoid double standards with regard to counter-terrorism and the threat that terrorism represents to Syria. Events in Lebanon and Iraq have proven that terrorism is not confined to a particular State, but that the threat extends to the countries of the entire region and beyond.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/217

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 25 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should to convey to you the following information:

The competent Syrian authorities intercepted a wireless communication between two terrorists in the Jawbar area of Damascus governorate. In that communication, one of the terrorists said that another terrorist named Abu Nadir was covertly distributing gas masks. The authorities also intercepted another communication between two other terrorists, one of whom is named Abu Jihad. In that communication, Abu Jihad indicates that toxic gas will be used and asked those who are working with him to supply protective masks.

This information, along with the information previously presented by the Syrian Government in letters to the Secretary-General, successive Presidents of the Security Council and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the most recent of which was issued as document S/2014/195, confirms that armed terrorist groups are preparing to use toxic gas in Jawbar quarter and other areas, in order to accuse the Syrian Government of having committed such an act of terrorism.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-27900 (E) 270314 280314

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United Nations S/2014/218

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 25 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

Armed terrorist groups continue to threaten and carry out terrorist attacks against chemical weapons facilities and the chemical substances being transported to the port of Ladhiqiyah for transfer outside Syrian territory. On 23 March 2014, the terrorist organization known as the Nusrah Front posted a video on the Youtube website under the heading "Nusrah Front earthquake — conquest of the Adra area, eastern Ghutah". The group is on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011). It is active in Syria, where it perpetrates barbaric terrorist attacks against the country's people and State institutions and infrastructure.

The video shows the preparations for the bombing of the Sukkar position in the Adra area of Rif Dimashq. A BMP armoured vehicle laden with 7,000 kilograms of TNT and C4 high-explosive driven by the terrorist Shamil al-Ansari was used to carry out the attack. A second car bomb driven by the Jordanian terrorist Abu Sayf al-Urduni was also used in the bombing. The video shows the preparation of the vehicle and the target of the suicide bombing.

I should be grateful if you could bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have the present letter circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-27923 (E) 270314 280314

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United Nations A/68/814–S/2014/219

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 25 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to set out the position of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) over the period from 4 December 2013 to 10 March 2014 (S/2014/199).

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it is committed to its obligations under the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement and has accordingly respected the mandate of UNDOF and facilitated its work in every way. The Government remains firmly committed to the safety and security of United Nations personnel and premises. For over four decades, for as long as Israel has occupied the Syrian Golan, the Government has cooperated and coordinated closely and fully with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDOF command.

- Israel, on the other hand, has persisted in its repeated violations of the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions. It has repeatedly attacked locations inside Syrian territory under spurious and mendacious pretexts. It has provided direct and indirect support for the armed terrorist groups active in and around the area of separation. On 5, 18 and 19 March 2014, Israel attacked civilian and military targets within Syrian territory in an act of direct support for the armed terrorist groups. The United Nations and the Security Council were immediately informed of the attacks. One officer of the internal security forces was killed, and 14 others were injured, along with four civilians. The locations sustained extensive material damage. In addition, the report details numerous Israeli violations of the Agreement on Disengagement. For example, on 11 February 2014, 11 Israeli soldiers crossed the line of separation. On 5 March 2014, Israel fired 17 tank rounds towards the village of Hamadiyah in the area of separation, injuring 14 people and damaging a mosque and a school.

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– In addition to those acts of aggression, Israel has directly supported the terrorist groups. It has treated injured terrorists and returned them into Syrian territory, where they have continued to commit their crimes against the local inhabitants and peacekeepers. Those violations are detailed in the report of the Secretary-General. All the while, Israel has made a point of complaining to the Security Council whenever a shepherd crosses the line of separation. Yet at the same time, on 31 January 2014, during his visit to the occupied Syrian Golan on 31 January 2014, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Israeli entity made statements that reflected an insolent approach to the events in Syria, exposed Israel's expansionist intentions and displayed utter disdain for all United Nations resolutions on ending the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan and all other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, particularly Security Council resolution 497 (1981). He urged parliament to settle the issue of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights within the framework of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the events in Syria, and stated that that comprehensive deal must include an understanding among Israel, the international community and, first and foremost, the United States of America, that the Golan was an integral part of the State of Israel. Mr. Liberman claimed that, because of the security concerns relating to Israel's ability to defend the north of the country, the international community should recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Those insolent statements make it incumbent on the Security Council to emphasize that, politically, legally and morally, it is unacceptable that Israel should be allowed to persist in its contemptuous refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions, particularly Security Council resolution 497 (1981), which states that the Israeli decision of 14 December 1981 to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan is null and void and without legal effect. The General Assembly has reaffirmed that position in its resolutions on the topic, the most recent of which is resolution 68/84.

– The report refers to numerous crimes and grave violations perpetrated by the armed terrorist groups with Israeli backing. UNDOF personnel saw the bodies of five individuals who had been beheaded. On 20 January 2014, the groups stopped an UNDOF convoy and looked for individuals of a specific nationality and religious affiliation. The terrorist groups used a tank in the vicinity of United Nations observation post 52, in addition to anti-tank missiles and improvised explosive devices. It is therefore no longer acceptable for the Secretariat to limit itself to calling on countries with influence to "strongly convey to the armed opposition groups in the UNDOF area of operation the need to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground". Rather, the Security Council must take immediate measures in respect of the States that support, fund and give safe haven to the armed terrorist groups. To ignore the danger posed by the groups' presence and activities in the area of separation would exacerbate the instability of the area and jeopardize the safety and security of United Nations personnel.

– Syria stresses the need for United Nations personnel to respect their mandate. It is therefore surprised at paragraph 24 of the report, which states that United Nations personnel at position 80 were unable to provide "food, medicine and water" to an "armed opposition group". Under the mandate of UNDOF and the

relevant Security Council resolutions, it is a given that the Force does not meet with terrorist groups.

- The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic stresses that it is mindful of its obligations and has exercised the utmost restraint in confronting the activities of armed terrorist groups in the UNDOF area of operation. It understands the character of the area and the obligations that are in force. It reiterates that the actions of Syrian law enforcement forces are a response to an emergency situation arising from exceptional circumstances, namely the terrorist activities of terrorist groups in the area of separation. Syrian law enforcement forces have acted in response to appeals from the local population. The latter has borne the brunt of the terrorist activities which, as the report of the Secretary-General recognizes, have also targeted UNDOF and its personnel.

- Syria commends the efforts of UNDOF to fulfil its mandate. It again emphasizes the need to address the fundamental reason for the presence of UNDOF, namely the continuing Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan. It reiterates its call on the Security Council to enforce its resolutions in that regard, particularly resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 497 (1981), which reject the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan and require Israel to withdraw from all occupied Arab territories, including the occupied Syrian Golan, to the line of 4 June 1967.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/220

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 March 2014
English
Original: French

Letter dated 26 March 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the sixth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations from 23 February to 22 March 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic accelerated the removal of chemical weapons material from its territory and made important progress in reducing its stockpile. As at 22 March 2014, the total figure for removal and destruction had reached 53.6 per cent. This includes almost 35 per cent of high priority chemical materials and more than 80 per cent of other chemical materials removed, as well as 93 per cent of declared isopropanol verified as destroyed.

The movements occurred within the framework of a sequenced plan of activities adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic, which stipulates that all chemical weapons material will be removed from its territory by 13 April 2014, aside from material located at two sites that are currently inaccessible owing to the security situation. All material is scheduled for removal or in-country destruction by the end of April 2014, contingent upon safe and secure access. The Syrian authorities at the highest level have reconfirmed their commitment to the elimination of the country's chemical weapons programme and to the further acceleration of the pace of removal wherever possible to meet its obligations under Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and relevant decisions of the OPCW Executive Council.

Activities towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

On 14 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted a sequenced plan of activities to the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (Joint Mission), detailing its schedule of movements of chemical weapons material from storage sites to the port of embarkation for removal from the country. Following consultations with the OPCW Operational Planning Group and the Joint Mission, the Syrian authorities submitted a revised plan on 23 February 2014 that reduced the schedule of operations and

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established milestones as outlined above. During the reporting period, the Joint Mission continued to work with the Syrian Arab Republic to achieve accelerated volume-based movements of all chemical weapons material, with a particular focus on high priority material requiring time for external destruction.

During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic conducted eight movements of chemical weapons material to Latakia for onward transportation out of the country, bringing the total number of movements since the commencement of operations to eleven. These movements included the removal of the entire declared stockpile of sulphur mustard, commonly known as "mustard gas", on 26 February 2014, as well as significant quantities of binary chemical weapons material.

In accordance with established procedure, the Joint Mission conducted sampling and analysis, as well as extensive verification of the removal of all chemical weapons material, physically at sites where security conditions allowed and remotely by surveillance camera equipment where they were not allowed. Additional verification and inspection activities were carried out at a temporary holding area near Damascus for one movement and at the port of Latakia prior to loading all shipments.

Regarding the destruction of chemical weapons material in-country, the Syrian Arab Republic destroyed some 93 per cent of isopropanol and 87 per cent of empty containers with sulphur mustard residue earlier in the year, before the intermediate deadline of 1 March 2014. This destruction was verified by the Joint Mission. The remaining quantities are stored at the two sites that are currently inaccessible owing to the prevailing security situation. The Syrian authorities have assured that the remaining material will also be destroyed in-country as soon as the sites become accessible. This destruction will be verified by the Joint Mission.

As regards the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, the Syrian Arab Republic rendered inoperable all production, mixing and filling equipment in October 2013 and subsequently destroyed all mobile production facilities, specialized equipment and special features at a number of facilities. These activities were verified by the Joint Mission when the security situation permitted. However, some standard equipment and buildings, including hangars and tunnel systems, were not destroyed in advance of the 15 March 2014 intermediate milestone. On 7 March 2014, the OPCW Executive Council requested the Syrian Arab Republic to submit a revised detailed plan for the destruction of these facilities, including proposed measures for verification, working in close consultation with OPCW experts. Subsequently, the Syrian Arab Republic facilitated the visit of a team of OPCW experts, which was supported by the Joint Mission, to assist in finalizing a revised detailed plan for destruction. The revised plan is to be submitted to the Executive Council at its next meeting on 28 March 2014. In the meantime, the Joint Mission continues to encourage the Syrian Arab Republic to destroy all other remaining equipment and buildings as soon as possible, so that verification can be carried out concurrently with ongoing site activities.

During the reporting period, the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission continued her engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other Member States contributing to the chemical weapons programme elimination process. She held regular discussions with senior Syrian Arab Republic officials in Damascus, visited Washington, D.C., London and Paris, and briefed Member States in New York, The Hague, Nicosia and Beirut on the progress in implementation.

The Joint Mission worked with Member States to facilitate the delivery of the remaining logistical equipment and material required for the ground movements and to enhance preparedness in the processing and loading of chemical weapons material at the port of Latakia. On 27 and 28 February 2014, the Joint Mission facilitated a meeting hosted by the Director-General of OPCW of Member States assisting in the maritime movement process. The meeting reinforced a common understanding of the requirements for the transit of chemical material to the different destruction destinations.

The security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic remained highly volatile and continued to present challenges on the ground. During the removal operation on 9 March 2014, six rockets hit Latakia, resulting in the injury of several Syrian civilians and property damage some distance from the port area. On 14 March 2014, the Syrian authorities reported that they had taken action to prevent another rocket attack on the city during a removal operation. On 19 March 2014 two more rockets hit Latakia the day before a removal operation, again resulting in injuries. The incidents did not stop the removal operations. As a result of the first attack, the Syrian authorities re-evaluated the security situation and put in place additional mitigation measures, and the movements continued broadly as scheduled.

During the period under review, the Syrian Arab Republic intermittently reported to the Joint Mission information received concerning planned attacks on chemical weapons storage sites and convoys. The Syrian authorities also informed the Joint Mission of the risk mitigation measures they were putting in place to safeguard the chemical material and personnel involved in the removal operations. In addition, as reported above, the security situation continued to prevent access to two storage sites. The precarious and unstable nature of the security situation further underlines the importance of expediting and securing the removal of chemical weapons material from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Joint Mission continues to assess the security situation to identify threats and to mitigate risks to its personnel and assets. It continues to reinforce its safety and security procedures at its headquarters and during its operations on the ground. As part of this ongoing assessment, the Joint Mission is looking at measures to reduce its footprint on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular in the light of the expected completion of chemical material removal in April 2014. As I have stated in my previous reports, the security of the Joint Mission ultimately remains the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Syrian authorities must continue to ensure the safety and security of all OPCW and United Nations personnel operating inside the country.

Conclusion

The Syrian Arab Republic has made important progress in removing chemical weapons material over the past few weeks. I welcome the constructive cooperation of the Syrian authorities in this regard.

The removal and destruction of remaining elements of the chemical weapons programme should now be brought to a timely conclusion. The challenging operating environment and the increasing number of security incidents underscore the urgency of the situation.

During the month of April, and in accordance with the revised plan, all remaining chemical weapons material should be removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, including chemical materials stored in sites that are currently inaccessible. The remaining quantities of isopropanol and empty containers with sulphur mustard residue should be destroyed. In addition, I expect that further progress will be made concerning the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.

I wish to express my appreciation to Member States for continuing to provide significant funds and assets towards the removal and destruction of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic. At a time when the situation in the country remains bleak, such international commitment is essential to ensure the timely elimination of the chemical weapons programme as part of wider efforts in the interests of peace and security for all the people of the Syrian Arab Republic.

I am also thankful to the Special Coordinator and the staff of the Joint Mission for their continuing work in often hazardous and dangerous circumstances inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

[Original: English]

Letter dated 24 March 2014 from the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 February 2014 to 22 March 2014 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet Üzümcü

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the sixth such monthly report.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of this decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 February to 22 March 2014.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of EC-M-34/DEC.1 establish intermediate completion dates for the removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons prior to their complete elimination in the first half of 2014. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling these obligations is described below:

(a) Pursuant to subparagraphs 2(a)(ii) and (iii) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, all chemicals listed in those subparagraphs were due to have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic by 31 December 2013 and 5 February 2014, respectively. However, as reported previously, these objectives were not met. On 23 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Director-General an amended time frame for the removal of all chemicals. In accordance with this amended time frame, the Syrian Arab Republic aims to complete the removal of all chemicals from its territory by 13 April 2014, except for chemicals located in facilities that are presently inaccessible. These chemicals could be removed whenever conditions are deemed suitable for movements from these sites but in any event are scheduled for transportation by 27 April 2014, according to the revised schedule;

(b) During the reporting period, a significant quantity of chemicals has been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. As at the cut-off date of this

report, the Syrian Arab Republic had made a total of 11 shipments of priority chemicals to the port of embarkation at Latakia (eight in the reporting period), where they were loaded onto the Danish and Norwegian cargo ships. These most recent shipments mean that almost 35% of declared Priority 1 chemicals and more than 80% of declared Priority 2 chemicals (making a combined total of 49.3% of Priority 1 and 2 chemicals) planned for destruction outside the Syrian Arab Republic have now been removed from Syrian territory. With a total of 93% of the declared isopropanol verified as destroyed on Syrian territory, the total percentage of chemicals both removed and destroyed comes to 53.6%. While progress in the removal of chemicals from Syrian Arab Republic has accelerated, particularly in the reporting period, the target date of 31 March 2014 for the effective destruction of Priority 1 chemicals set by subparagraph 3(a) of EC-M-34/DEC.1 will not be met;

(c) Pursuant to subparagraph 2(b) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was requested to destroy all of its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) by 15 March 2014. However, this objective has not been met. As previously reported, a total of 26 CWPFs were declared. During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out further destruction activities at declared CWPFs. As at the cut-off date of this report, of these 26 CWPFs: eight mobile units had been destroyed and verified; at one CWPF, all declared specialised buildings and equipment had been destroyed and verified; at four CWPFs, all declared specialised/standard buildings and equipment had been destroyed but verification was pending; and at 12 CWPFs, either standard equipment and/or specialised/standard buildings remained to be destroyed and verified. As requested by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.13 of EC-75/2, dated 7 March 2014), the Syrian Arab Republic is now working on a revised detailed plan for the destruction of the remaining CWPFs to be submitted to the Secretariat, in order for the combined plans for destruction and verification to be submitted to the Council and agreed upon between the Council and the Syrian Arab Republic at its Fortieth Meeting, on 28 March 2014;

(d) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of chemical weapons and CWPFs. The fourth such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 17 March 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-M-40/P/NAT.1, dated 17 March 2014);

(e) On 7 March 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted an amendment to its initial declaration. The Secretariat is currently in the process of seeking clarifications on this amendment; and

(f) In accordance with subparagraph 1(e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter "the Joint Mission") in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

5. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organisations and between the offices in New York, The Hague, Cyprus, and Damascus. As at the cut-off date of this report, 17 OPCW staff members were deployed with the Joint Mission in Damascus and Latakia, and one logistics officer in Beirut. A team of five experts was also temporarily deployed between 11 and 21 March 2014, pursuant to the request by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session in relation to CWPFs (paragraph 7.14 of EC-75/2). Further information on the team of experts is provided in paragraph 9 below.

6. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission, Ms Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. The Special Coordinator briefed the Council on 4 March 2014. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has continued to provide weekly information briefings to States Parties in The Hague on behalf of the Director-General. Following the request by the Council at its Seventy Fifth Session that the Director-General brief delegations each week on progress in implementing the plan for the removal of Syrian chemical weapons (paragraph 7.12 of EC-75/2), these information briefings have now been formalised.

7. Given the increased tempo of removal activities, the Joint Mission has been heavily involved in verifying the packing and loading of chemicals prior to their transportation to the port of embarkation at Latakia. As previously reported, activities at the relevant chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs) included verifying the chemicals against the initial declaration, taking an inventory of the chemicals loaded into each shipping container, conducting sampling on a random basis, and sealing the containers. During the reporting period, the Syrian authorities began to make use of "armoured jackets" procured with funding from the Joint Mission and intended to provide additional protection for containers carrying liquid chemicals. Upon the arrival of the containers at Latakia, the inventory documents for each shipping container were checked, the integrity of the seals was confirmed, and the contents of the containers were verified on a random basis. Once the containers were securely loaded on board the cargo ships, they returned to international waters, where, along with the naval escorts, they will await further deliveries of chemicals to Latakia.

8. Joint Mission personnel have also visited several CWPFs to verify destruction activities carried out by the Syrian Arab Republic. In addition, Joint Mission personnel visited two CWSFs to confirm that they no longer contained chemical weapons. A closure report has been signed and completed for one of these CWSFs and a closure report for the second CWSF will shortly be submitted to the Syrian authorities. A further four CWSFs are empty and pending verification by Joint Mission personnel.

9. As mentioned above, at the request of the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (paragraph 7.14 of EC-75/2), the Secretariat deployed a team of experts to the

Syrian Arab Republic to carry out the necessary studies and to render appropriate advice to the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate the preparation by the Syrian authorities of the revised detailed plan for destruction requested by the Council for the remaining 12 CWPFs. The team of experts arrived in the Syrian Arab Republic on 11 March 2014 and visited six CWPFs, including two types of hangars (single and double), as well as four of the five underground structures (tunnels). One underground structure could not be visited due to security considerations. Based on the outcome of the on-site visits and detailed discussions with the team of experts from the Secretariat, the Syrian Arab Republic is expected to submit to the Secretariat its revised detailed plan for the destruction of the remaining CWPFs.

10. As previously reported, at its Thirty-Eighth Meeting, the Council approved a model agreement (EC-M-38/DEC.1, dated 30 January 2014) specifying the arrangements governing on-site inspections at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 or sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2. On the basis of this model agreement, the Secretariat conducted negotiations with the governments of Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. An agreement with Finland and an arrangement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland were approved by the Council at its Seventy-Fifth Session (EC-75/DEC.4 and EC-75/DEC.3 respectively, both dated 5 March 2014). An arrangement with Germany and a facility agreement with the United States of America are being finalised with the aim of submitting them to the Council for approval at its Fortieth Meeting. Once destruction activities commence at these facilities, the Director General will report on progress via these monthly reports, as required by paragraph 4 of EC-M-38/DEC.1.

11. As reported previously, the Secretariat, as required by paragraph 13 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, has developed a draft facility agreement for Syrian CWSFs and submitted the draft to the Syrian authorities for their comments, which are still pending.

Supplementary resources

12. As reported in the previous monthly report, several States Parties are providing assistance and resources for the purposes of the transportation, removal, and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. All equipment requested by the Syrian Arab Republic has now been provided, either through the Joint Mission or under bilateral arrangements, and all the elements necessary for the removal of chemical weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and their subsequent destruction are now in place.

13. As at the cut-off date of this report, the balance in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 47.5 million. Contributions have been received from Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the

Destruction of Chemical Weapons. A further contribution of EUR 2 million is expected from Italy, and India has committed to contribute approximately EUR 736,000.

Conclusion

14. With the accelerated pace of removal that is now under way, important progress has been made towards meeting the 30 June 2014 deadline for the completion of destruction of all declared chemicals.

15. The Syrian Arab Republic has reaffirmed its commitment to the complete elimination of its chemical weapons by this deadline. In order to realise this objective, it will be important to maintain and possibly enhance the current momentum of removal activities.

United Nations S/2014/221

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 March 2014

Original: English

Third report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), in which the Council requested me to report and provide analysis to the Council on the usage and expenditure of the escrow accounts referenced in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution on an annual basis, with the first report no later than 31 March 2012, and the final report occurring three months after the transfer of any remaining funds retained for the purposes of paragraphs 4 and 5 to the Government of Iraq by 31 December 2016, unless otherwise authorized by the Security Council.

II. Background

2. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 1958 (2010), the Secretariat transferred from the Iraq Account: (a) US$ 20 million to the administrative escrow account exclusively for the expenses of the United Nations related to the orderly termination of the residual activities of the "oil-for-food" programme, including the Organization's support to Member State investigations and Member State proceedings related to the programme, and the expenses of the office of the High-level Coordinator created pursuant to Security Council resolution 1284 (1999); and (b) US$ 131 million to the indemnification escrow account for the indemnification of the Government of Iraq to the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors.

3. In its resolution 2107 (2013), the Security Council decided to terminate the arrangements set forth in paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999).

III. Administrative escrow account

4. I should like to inform the members of the Council that the activities undertaken and funded as outlined in paragraph 4 of resolution 1958 (2010) from 1 January to 31 December 2013 have led to expenditure amounting to $850,978. The breakdown of the above expenditure is as follows: (a) $594,849 for the activities related to the orderly termination of the residual activities of the "oil-for-food" programme; (b) $207,119 for the Organization's support to Member State

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investigations and Member State proceedings related to the programme; and (c) $49,010 for the office of the High-level Coordinator created pursuant to resolution 1284 (1999).*

IV. Indemnification escrow account

5. I should like to inform the members of the Council that no expenditures have been incurred to date in respect of the amount referred to in paragraph 5 of resolution 1958 (2010). Following my last report to the Council of 26 March 2013 (S/2013/191), the Secretariat met again with the Government of Iraq to negotiate the implementing agreements as provided for in paragraph 7 of resolution 1958 (2010). However, differences continue to remain between the Government of Iraq and the Secretariat as to whether the Government of Iraq's obligation to indemnify the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors, should: (a) be limited to the amount held in the indemnification escrow account; and (b) expire and lapse on 31 December 2016. The Secretariat will continue discussions with a view to concluding the indemnification agreements, and I will apprise the Security Council of the outcome of the Secretariat's continued efforts.

V. Other

6. In paragraph 2 of resolution 1958 (2010), the Council called upon the Government of Iraq to provide without delay direct payment to the beneficiaries or their representatives of the letters of credit as referenced in the note by the Secretary-General, dated 8 December 2010 (S/2010/619, paras. 11 and 12, and annexes II and III).

7. In my reports of 2 April 2012 (S/2012/191) and 26 March 2013 (S/2013/191), I advised the Council that payments to certain beneficiaries remained outstanding. As this situation has not changed, I reiterate my concern that the payments have not been made, and I continue to urge the Government of Iraq to provide the payments without any delay to the beneficiaries as called for by the Council in its resolution 1958 (2010).

* Expenditures of the office of the High-level Coordinator relate to activities in 2012.

United Nations S/2014/222

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 March 2014

Original: English

Australia, France, Luxembourg and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), especially its resolutions 2136 (2014), 2098 (2013), 2078 (2012), 2076 (2012) and 2053 (2012),

Recalling its resolution 2086 (2013) and reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as all States in the region and *emphasizing* the need to respect fully the principles of non-interference, good-neighbourliness and regional cooperation,

Stressing the primary responsibility of the government of DRC for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its civilians with respect to the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law,

Noting that eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring cycles of conflict and persistent violence by armed groups, both Congolese and foreign, and *emphasizing* the need to address the root causes of conflict to put an end to these recurring cycles of violence,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU) to restore peace and security in eastern DRC, and *encouraging* the government of the DRC to continue to ensure close cooperation with these and other international parties,

Recalling the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013 of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region ("the PSC Framework"), under the auspices of its guarantors, namely the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the SADC and Chairperson of the ICGLR, and *calling on* all parties to continue to implement promptly, fully and in good faith their respective commitments,

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Welcoming the Regional Oversight Mechanism's calling for a broader political dialogue in its January 2014 communique, and the initial dialogue between key signatories states initiated by Angola in its role as Chair of the ICGLR, *encouraging* the continuation of such dialogue under the auspices of the PSC Framework to resolve the root causes of conflict in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, and *welcoming* the continued engagement of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region,

Reaffirming its strongest support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in the implementation of their mandate, and *strongly encouraging* the continuation of their efforts,

Reiterating its deep concern regarding the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC due to ongoing destabilizing activities of foreign and domestic armed groups, and *stressing* the importance of neutralizing all armed groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the Bakata-Katanga and various Mayi Mayi groups,

Welcoming the end of the rebellion by the 23 March Movement (M23) and the signing in Nairobi by the M23, the Government of DRC, the SADC and the ICGLR of the documents concluding the Kampala Dialogue facilitated by Uganda as chair of the ICGLR, *stressing* the importance of ensuring that all provisions of the signed documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith and, in this regard, that the M23 does not regroup and resume military activities, in line with the Nairobi declarations and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Expressing deep concern regarding the sustained regional threat posed by the FDLR, a group under UN sanctions whose leaders and members include perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed, and have continued to promote and commit ethnically-based and other killings in Rwanda and the DRC, and *stressing* the importance of permanently addressing this threat,

Expressing concern that the FDLR, as well as other armed groups, continue to have freedom of movement in the DRC, *noting with deep concern* reports indicating FARDC collaboration with the FDLR at a local level and *welcoming* in this regard the plans by the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, to neutralize the FDLR, and *stressing* the need to put such plans into sustained action,

Recalling the Security Council's Presidential Statements on the Central African Region and the LRA, including S/PRST/2013/18 and S/PRST/2013/6, *commending* the important ongoing efforts being undertaken by MONUSCO in the fight against the LRA, *encouraging* further efforts of the AU-Regional task force, and *urging* greater cooperation and information-sharing between relevant UN bodies, the AU-Regional Task Force regional forces and non-governmental organisations in tackling the threat of the LRA,

Expressing deep concern regarding the increasing number of internally displaced persons in the DRC, now reaching more than 2,9 million, and the over 456,000 refugees from eastern DRC caused by the various Congolese and foreign armed groups active in the region, *calling upon* the DRC and all States in the region to work towards the peaceful environment conducive to the eventual voluntary

return and reintegration of refugees to the DRC, with the support, as appropriate, of the UNHCR, *commending* in this regard the support provided by neighbouring countries to refugees from the DRC and *encouraging* the Rwandan and the Ugandan Governments, United Nations and international organizations to work together to urgently address the situation of former M23 combatants in Uganda and Rwanda,

Noting that it has been more than a year that hundreds of M23 combatants, including individuals designated by the Security Council, fled from the DRC into Rwanda on 18 March 2013, *encouraging* the Government of Rwanda, with the assistance of relevant UN and international organizations, to continue to ensure that these combatants are permanently demobilized and are dealt with according to relevant international law including special attention to children and women among them, and recalling the Member States' obligations, as renewed by resolution 2136 (2014),

Calling upon all parties in the conflict to respect the impartiality, independence and neutrality of humanitarian actors,

Remaining greatly concerned by the humanitarian situation that continues to severely affect the civilian population, in particular in eastern DRC, and the persistent high levels of violence and violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international law, *condemning* in particular those involving the targeted attacks against civilians, widespread sexual and gender-based violence, systematic recruitment and use of children by certain parties to the conflict, the displacement of significant numbers of civilians, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests and *recognizing* their deleterious effect on the stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts in the DRC,

Recalling its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013) on women, peace and security, its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012) and 2143 (2014) on children and armed conflict,

Welcoming the efforts of MONUSCO and international partners in delivering training in human rights, child protection and protection from sexual and gender-based violence for Congolese security institutions and underlining its importance, and *welcoming* the establishment of the Women's Platform for the PSC Framework in an effort to ensure the full participation of women in the PSC Framework peace process,

Noting the ongoing efforts made by the Government of the DRC to combat sexual violence in conflict including through the implementation of its National Strategy and the commitments outlined in the Joint Communiqué between the Government of the DRC and the United Nations on the Fight Against Sexual Violence in Conflict adopted in Kinshasa on 30 March 2013, and *strongly encouraging* the Government of DRC to increase its efforts in this regard,

Acknowledging the adoption of the Framework of Cooperation between the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the African Union Commission Concerning the Prevention and Response to Conflict-related Sexual Violence in Africa adopted in Addis Ababa on 31 January 2014,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General S/2014/181 which includes a list of parties responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict,

Condemning the mass rapes in Minova and the surrounding villages in November 2012 reportedly committed by soldiers of the Armed forces of the DRC (FARDC), *taking note* of the investigations and arrests undertaken thereafter by the Congolese authorities and the initial trials that are underway, *expressing concern* at the delays in the trials of those indicted, and *urging* the Congolese authorities to hold the perpetrators accountable while ensuring all investigations and trials respect due process,

Calling for all those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law or violations and abuses of human rights, as applicable, including those involving violence or abuses against children and acts of sexual and gender-based violence, to be swiftly apprehended, brought to justice and held accountable,

Stressing the need for cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Government of the DRC, *welcoming* the commitment made by the Government of the DRC to hold accountable those responsible for serious crimes, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the country, and *stressing* the importance of actively seeking to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country and of regional and international cooperation to this end,

Recalling the Secretary-General's call to the Council to reject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and *welcoming* in this regard the promulgation of the Amnesty law in DRC, excluding those who have committed genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and *urging* the government of DRC to follow through by undertaking the necessary judicial reform to ensure that the DRC effectively addresses impunity,

Urging the Government of the DRC to remain fully committed to the implementation of the PSC Framework, including through the adoption of a priority action plan, and to protecting the civilian population through the swift establishment of professional, accountable and sustainable security forces, the deployment of an accountable Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, judiciary, prison and territorial administration and the consolidation of rule of law and promotion and protection of human rights,

Urging the Government of the DRC to take immediate steps to uphold its commitment to security sector reform, including the creation and support of a Rapid Reaction Force, the development of a roadmap for the security and justice sectors, the development of a comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) plan, *noting* in this regard that the Government has proposed a new DDR plan, all of which will require the allocation of necessary resources and a continued commitment from the Government to prioritize reform, and *regretting* that progress has been slow up to date,

Reiterating its call on all parties to cooperate fully with MONUSCO, and its condemnation of any and all attacks against peacekeepers, *emphasizing* that those

responsible for such attacks must be held accountable, and *recalling* its decision to extend sanctions measures outlined in paragraph 3 of the Resolution 2136 (2014) to individuals and entities who plan, direct, sponsor or participate in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers,

Reiterating its call upon the Secretary-General to take all measures deemed necessary to strengthen UN field security arrangements and improve the safety and security of all military contingents, police officers, military observers, and especially unarmed observers,

Recognizing the significant sacrifices made by MONUSCO, *commending* the active steps taken by MONUSCO, including its Intervention Brigade acting with the support of and in cooperation with MONUSCO's wider Force structure, to implement fully its mandate, in particular the protection of civilians, and *encouraging* the continuation of these efforts by the Mission,

Affirming that the successful protection of civilians is critical to the fulfilment of MONUSCO's mandate and the delivery of an improved security environment, in this regard, *recognising* that MONUSCO has successfully deterred attacks on civilians through its approach to protection of civilians and *welcoming* the efforts made by the mission to adapt the Force in order to enhance the delivery of the mission's comprehensive protection of civilians strategy, including by becoming more flexible, versatile, and widely deployable across the whole of eastern DRC,

Underlining the importance of MONUSCO deterring any threats to the implementation of its mandate,

Recognizing the contribution of MONUSCO to a comprehensive strategy for durable peace and security, *noting with appreciation* the contribution that MONUSCO makes to early peacebuilding and *emphasizing* that MONUSCO's activities should be conducted in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of relapse into armed conflict and progress towards sustainable peace and development,

Stressing the importance of the full and urgent implementation of the PSC Framework to permanently reducing threats against civilians, *noting* the need for MONUSCO to strengthen support to the government of the DRC to enable it to address security challenges and extend state authority of the government of DRC as expressed in paragraph 5 of the PSC Framework, and *recognizing* the need for a comprehensive peace process to put an end to the sources of conflict in the region,

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

MONUSCO's mandate

1. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MONUSCO in the DRC, including, on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping, its Intervention Brigade, within the authorized troop ceiling of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, 1050 personnel of formed police units, until 31 March 2015;

2. *Commends* MONUSCO, including its Intervention Brigade, for the positive impact on peace and stability in eastern DRC and on the protection of civilians, *fully supports* the actions undertaken by the SRSG in the implementation of the mission's mandate, and *encourages* MONUSCO to maximise Force interoperability, flexibility and effectiveness in the implementation of the entirety of MONUSCO's mandate, in line with the Secretary-General's report (S/2014/157), bearing in mind the safety and security of all military contingents, police officers, military observers, and especially unarmed observers;

3. *Notes* the need for a clear exit strategy, including for the Intervention brigade, and *decides* that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO and its mandate should be determined on the basis of the evolution of the situation on the ground and, in the context of implementation by the Government of the DRC and all other signatories of the PSC Framework, progress towards the following objectives, in line with the three priorities of Protection of civilians, stabilisation and support to the implementation of the PSC framework, as set out in the mission concept:

(a) Reduction of the threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups, violence against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence and violence against children to a level that can be effectively managed by the Congolese justice and security institutions;

(b) Stabilization through the establishment of functional, professional, and accountable state institutions, including security institutions, in conflict-affected areas, and through strengthened democratic practices that reduces the risk of instability, including adequate political space, promotion and protection of human rights and a credible electoral process;

4. *Authorizes* MONUSCO, in pursuit of the objectives described in paragraph 3 above, to take all necessary measures to perform the following tasks;

(a) Protection of civilians

(i) Ensure, within its area of operations, effective protection of civilians under threat of physical violence, including through active patrolling, paying particular attention to civilians gathered in displaced and refugee camps, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, in the context of violence emerging from any of the parties engaged in the conflict, and mitigate the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation;

(ii) Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(iii) Work with the Government of the DRC to identify threats to civilians and implement existing prevention and response plans and strengthen civil-military cooperation, including joint-planning, to ensure the protection of civilians from abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against children, and *requests* MONUSCO to ensure that child protection and gender concerns are integrated into all operations and strategic aspects of MONUSCO's work and accelerate the implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence and the swift deployment of Women Protection

Advisers as called for in resolution 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013), in order to seek commitments on the prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence;

(b) Neutralizing armed groups through the Intervention brigade

In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), in cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO, prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;

(c) Monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo

Monitor the implementation of the arms embargo as described in paragraph 1 of resolution 2136 (2014) in cooperation with the Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004), and in particular observe and report on flows of military personnel, arms or related materiel across the eastern border of the DRC, including by using, as specified in the letter of the Council from 22 January 2013 (S/2013/44), surveillance capabilities provided by unmanned aerial systems, seize, collect and dispose of arms or related materials brought into the DRC in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 of resolution 2136 (2014), and share relevant information with the Group of Experts;

(d) Provision of support to national and international judicial processes

Support and work with the Government of the DRC to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, including through cooperation with States of the region and the ICC;

5. *Authorizes* MONUSCO, in support of the Congolese authorities and their efforts to deliver the reforms called by the PSC Framework and stabilisation in eastern DRC, to contribute to the following tasks, in coordination with the UNCT and other actors, including through the SRSG's good offices;

(a) Encourage and accelerate national ownership of Security Sector Reform (SSR) by the DRC authorities, including through the urgent finalisation and implementation of a national strategy for the establishment of effective, inclusive and accountable security and justice institutions by the DRC and play a leading role in coordinating the support for SSR provided by international and bilateral partners and the UN system;

(b) Promote peace consolidation and inclusive and transparent political dialogue among all Congolese stakeholders with a view to furthering reconciliation

and democratization and encourage the organization of credible and transparent elections in line with the electoral cycle and the constitution;

(c) Encourage the consolidation of an effective national civilian structure to control key mining activities and to manage in an equitable manner the extraction and trade of natural resources in eastern DRC;

(d) Monitor, report and follow-up on human rights violations and abuses, including in the context of elections, and support the UN system in-country to ensure that any support provided by the United Nations shall be consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights law and refugee law as applicable;

(e) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to enable the development and finalisation of a clear and comprehensive SSR implementation roadmap including benchmarks and timelines to establish effective and accountable security institutions, including vetting mechanisms;

(f) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in compliance with the HRDDP, for a reform of the army, including, as a first step, the establishment of a vetted, well-trained and adequately equipped "Rapid Reaction Force" within the FARDC which should form the nucleus for a professional, accountable, well-sustained and effective national defence force, and support, when appropriate and in coordination with international partners, the training of the "Rapid Reaction Force" which should, in the frame of the benchmarks and timelines set by the SSR roadmap, develop the capacity to assume as soon as possible security responsibilities from the Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO;

(g) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC for the design and implementation of DDR and DDRRR plans for foreign and Congolese combatants not suspected of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights, aimed at integration into a peaceful civilian life contributing to stable communities in eastern DRC, while paying specific attention to the needs of children formerly associated with armed forces and groups;

(h) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC, in close cooperation with other international partners, to build on the Government's STAREC and revised ISSSS to support the establishment of a minimum level of sustainable state authority and control in conflict-affected areas in eastern DRC, including through area-based efforts to improve security, state authority and enable the commencement of sustainable socio-economic recovery;

(i) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC for the reform of the police, including by contributing, in compliance with the HRDDP, to the provision of training to battalions of the Congolese National Police (PNC);

(j) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC for the development and the implementation, in accordance with the Congolese strategy for justice reform, of a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop independent criminal justice institutions and processes, the police, the judiciary and prisons in conflict-affected areas;

(k) Provide good offices, advice and support to the Government of the DRC to promote human rights and to fight impunity, including through the

implementation of the Government's "zero tolerance policy" with respect to discipline and human rights and international humanitarian law violations, committed by elements of the security sector;

(l) Continue to collaborate with the Government of the DRC in the swift and vigorous implementation of the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence against children by FARDC, and continue dialogue with all listed parties to obtain further commitments and work towards the development and implementation of time bound action plans to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children in violation of applicable international law and other violations of international humanitarian law;

6. *Reiterates* that multi-dimensional peacekeeping requires a comprehensive approach, and *requests* MONUSCO's military and civilian components to focus on a coherent division of labour in accordance with their respective comparative advantages and available capacities;

7. *Stresses* that integrated action on the ground by security and development actors requires coordination with national authorities in order to stabilize and improve the security situation and assist in restoration of State authority, and *underlines* the importance of integrated efforts among all United Nations entities in the field to promote coherence in the United Nations' work in conflict and post-conflict situations;

Transfer of Responsibilities

8. *Requests* that the Secretary-General continue to report on the current division of labour between MONUSCO and the UNCT on tasks shared by the Mission, the UNCT and the Government of the DRC and on the roadmap on the transfer of responsibilities to other actors, primarily the government of DRC, but also the UNCT and donors, in order to streamline the tasks assigned to MONUSCO, and *expresses* its intention to keep the mandate of MONUSCO under review on the basis of this reporting;

9. *Calls upon* MONUSCO to continue to work with the UNCT and the Congolese authorities towards the adoption and implementation of the Peace Consolidation Programme covering provinces not affected by the conflict, and *requests* MONUSCO, where appropriate, to continue transferring tasks to the UNCT and the Congolese authorities in those provinces;

10. *Urges* the international community and donors to support MONUSCO and the UNCT and calls upon the Government of the DRC and neighbouring States to remain engaged in the process of transfer of responsibilities;

Elections

11. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC and its national partners to ensure a transparent and credible electoral process, in fulfilment of their primary responsibility to create propitious conditions for the forthcoming elections, and *urges* the Government as well as all relevant parties to ensure an environment conducive to a free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral process, which includes free and constructive political debate, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, equitable access to media including State media, safety and freedom of movement for all candidates, as well as for election observers

and witnesses, journalists, human rights defenders and actors from civil society including women;

12. *Calls on* the Government of the DRC to adopt without delay the electoral cycle roadmap and budget, and, upon notification to the Security Council by the Secretary-General of their adoption, *authorizes* MONUSCO to provide logistical support, as appropriate and in coordination with Congolese authorities and the UNCT, to facilitate the electoral cycle, and *decides* that this support will be continually assessed and reviewed according to the progress made by the Congolese authorities in the steering of the electoral process, in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 16 of resolution 2053 (2012);

PSC Framework

13. *Reiterates* the importance of implementing the PSC Framework to the achievement of long term stability of eastern DRC and the region;

14. *Urges* all signatory States of the PSC Framework to continue to fully and promptly implement their commitments in good faith;

15. *Calls on* the government of DRC, which has the primary responsibility for safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to make further meaningful progress in implementing its commitments under the PSC Framework, as well as the other signatories of the PSC Framework;

16. *Calls on* the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, in coordination with and with the appropriate support from the Special Representative for the DRC, to continue to lead, coordinate and assess the implementation of the national and regional commitments under the PSC framework and, building on the PSC Framework, to *encourage* a high level regional political dialogue between key signatories to address the underlying root causes of the conflict, noting the initial dialogue between key signatories already underway under the leadership of Angola as Chair of the ICGLR and encouraging the Special Envoy to continue to engage with this process;

Armed Groups

17. *Strongly condemns* all armed groups operating in the region and their violations of international humanitarian law as well as other applicable international law, and abuses of human rights including attacks on the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, summary executions, sexual and gender based violence and large scale recruitment and use of children, and *reiterates* that those responsible will be held accountable;

18. *Demands* that the FDLR, the ADF, the LRA, the Bakata-Katanga and various Mayi Mayi groups cease immediately all forms of violence and other destabilizing activities and that their members immediately and permanently disband, lay down their arms and demobilize children from their ranks;

19. *Expressing concern* that the FDLR, as well as other armed groups, continue to have freedom of movement in the DRC, *noting with deep concern* reports indicating FARDC collaboration with the FDLR at a local level and *welcoming* in this regard the plans by the FARDC, supported by MONUSCO, to neutralize the FDLR, and *stressing* the need to put such plans into sustained action;

20. *Demands* that the Government of the DRC, per its commitments in the Nairobi Declarations of 12 December 2013, take immediate steps to implement its DDR programme, in coordination with the United Nations, international organizations and neighbouring countries where former M23 combatants have found refuge, *requests*, in this respect, and in accordance with the Nairobi declarations and in line with commitments under the PSC Framework agreement, the United Nations and international organizations to work together with neighbouring states to urgently address the situation of former M23 combatants located in their territories, *and stresses the importance* of ensuring that all provisions of the signed documents are implemented swiftly and in good faith and, in this regard, that the M23 does not regroup and resume military activities, in line with the Nairobi declarations and relevant Security Council resolutions;

21. *Calls on* the government of the DRC to urgently put in place and implement comprehensive DDR and DDRRR Plans to be able to effectively deal with former combatants;

22. *Notes* that former M23 combatants, including individuals designated by the Security Council, fled from the DRC into Rwanda and Uganda, especially following the defeat of M23 in DRC, *encourages* the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda, with the assistance of the United Nations and relevant international organizations, to continue to ensure that these combatants are permanently demobilized, that Congolese combatants are returned to the DRC to complete a DDR process, as appropriate, and are dealt with according to relevant international law, with special attention to children and women among them, and *recalls* Member States' obligations under the PSC Framework and the sanctions regime as renewed by resolution 2136 (2014);

23. *Reiterates* its support to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) as a regional confidence-building mechanism, and *welcomes* the decision of the ICGLR to grant permanent representation of MONUSCO in this mechanism;

Human Rights/Humanitarian

24. *Urges* the Government of the DRC to arrest and hold accountable those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the country, and *stresses the importance* to this end of both regional cooperation and cooperation with the ICC;

25. *Calls upon* the Congolese authorities to ensure the prosecution of those responsible for the grave human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of the 28 November 2011 elections;

26. *Encourages* the Government of the DRC to continue to build on its cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict and to vigorously implement, with the support of MONUSCO as appropriate, the action plan to prevent and end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the FARDC, and *encourages* President Kabila to swiftly appoint the proposed Presidential Adviser on Sexual Violence and the Recruitment of Children;

27. *Requests* MONUSCO to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of the

DRC in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels, including in stabilisation activities, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in the national political dialogue and electoral processes, through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers, and *further requests* enhanced reporting by MONUSCO to the Council on this issue;

28. *Requests* MONUSCO to take fully into account child protection as a cross cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of the DRC in ensuring that the protection of children's rights is taken into account, inter alia, in DDR processes and in security sector reform in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children;

29. *Calls upon* all actors to strengthen their efforts to combat impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, to provide all necessary services to survivors, and to ensure the equal and full inclusion of women in the PSC Framework and at all stages of conflict resolution, reconstruction and the promotion of peace including through taking account of the call of the 11 July 2013 Bujumbura Declaration for ensuring that benchmarks, indicators and follow-up measures of the plan of implementation for the PSC Framework are gender-sensitive;

MONUSCO

30. *Calls on* MONUSCO to coordinate strategies with other UN missions in the region for enhanced information-sharing in light of the attacks by the LRA, and *reiterates* support to the respective initiatives taken by the UN and the AU to facilitate regional action against the LRA, consistent with paragraph 4 (a);

31. *Encourages* MONUSCO to enhance its interaction with the civilian population to raise awareness and understanding about its mandate and activities through a comprehensive public outreach programme, to identify potential threats against the civilian population and to collect reliable information on violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights perpetrated against civilians;

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of MONUSCO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed if cases of such conduct occur;

33. *Requests* MONUSCO to ensure that any support provided to national security forces is in strict compliance with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, *urges* the United Nations system in DRC to adopt a join and uniform approach regarding HRDDP implementation;

34. *Demands* that all parties cooperate fully with the operations of MONUSCO and allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unhindered access for United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate and the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need, in particular to internally displaced persons, throughout the territory of the DRC, respecting the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and relevant provisions of international law;

35. *Calls on* all Member States to generously contribute to the UN humanitarian appeal for the DRC to help ensure that UN humanitarian agencies and other international organizations are fully funded and able to address the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced people, survivors of sexual violence, and other vulnerable communities;

36. *Calls on* Member states to pledge and provide the remaining force enablers, in particular military air assets, required for the Mission, and recalls the importance of close consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries;

37. *Notes* that it is important that all MONUSCO contingents, including the contingents of the Intervention Brigade, are properly prepared and effectively equipped to be able to carry out their respective tasks;

38. *Expresses* its full support to the UN Group of Experts established by resolution 1533 (2004) and *calls for* enhanced cooperation between all States, particularly those in the region, MONUSCO and the Group of Experts, *encourages* all parties and all States to ensure cooperation with the Group of Experts by individuals and entities within their jurisdiction or under their control and *reiterates* its demand that all parties and all States ensure the safety of its members and its support staff, and unhindered and immediate access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Group of Experts deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

Strategic Review

39. *Requests* that the Secretary-General conduct a thorough Strategic Review of MONUSCO and the wider UN presence in DRC in order to provide recommendations on MONUSCO's future objectives, activities, exit strategy and effective deployment of resources, to the Security Council by 30 December 2014, bearing in mind the need to continue to increase the effectiveness of the mission;

Reports by the Secretary-General

40. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on:

(i) the situation on the ground, including sexual violence and the impact of conflict on women and children;

(ii) progress made by the DRC in the implementation of its commitments under the PSC Framework, including through the establishment and implementation of a national security sector reform roadmap and the creation of a Congolese "Rapid Reaction Force", and on the implementation of the DDR and DDRRR plans;

(iii) the implementation by MONUSCO of its mandate, including the activities of the Intervention brigade, its reconfiguration to conduct the tasks set out above and the ongoing transfer of responsibilities to other actors;

(iv) the risks and their implications for the safety and the security for the UN personnel and facilities as a result of the possible military operations as well as measures taken to strengthen their security and mitigate risks;

41. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every six months, in coordination with his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region and his Special Representative for the DRC on the implementation of the commitments under the PSC Framework;

42. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.